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I. INTODUCTION
To date, while a few groups actively debate the virtues of
sanctioning the use of the dollar by other nations, the prevailing
attitude in the United States toward this issue could most accu-
rately be described as ambivalent.1 Exemplary of such noncha-
lance are publications by certain think tanks, which explain that
"U.S. views are generally agnostic [because] no one really knows
whether the United States would be better off or worse off if
some other countries switched to using the dollar in their finan-
cial systems."2 Unfortunately, this widespread opinion held by
both the public-at-large and the majority of politicians in Wash-
ington is not founded on facts and vigorous, open debate. In-
stead, disinformation and apocalyptic predictions have been
utilized to impede U.S. support of dollarization in, among other
areas, Latin America.
Despite these attempts to obscure the truth, certain experts
have recognized the true benefits and inevitability of dollariza-
tion of Latin American countries. According to these experts,
while the United States should not actively urge other countries
to make this determination, "given that the U.S. has an enlight-
ened self-interest in allowing dollarization, we should certainly
remove unnecessary barriers to dollarization."3 The primary bar-
1. See generally, Ricardo Hausmann, Should There Be Five Currencies or One Hundred
and Five?, FOREIGN POLICY, Sept. 22, 1999, at 65. As with any polemic issue, opinions of
experts regarding the appropriate strategy to be utilized by the United States under the
circumstances are diametrically opposed. Based on the information available on this
topic, it appears that the only thing on which the experts agree is that they will continue
to disagree: "[Tihe debate has quickly become polarized: Both sides seem to accept that
there can be no middle ground, no half-way arrangement..." Id. at 66.
2. Roger M. Kubarych, Introduction to "The Benefits and Costs of Moving Toward Dol-
larization in North America", LOOKING AHEAD, Sept. 1999, at 3, 3. See also International
Monetary Stability Act: Hearing on S. Res. 1879 Before the S. Subcomm. on Economic Pol-
icy, (Feb. 8, 2000) (statement of the Honorable Edwin M. Truman, Asst. Sec. for Int'l Affs.,
U.S. Treasury) available at http://www.banking.senate.gov./00_02hrg/020800/
truman.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2001) [hereinafter HearingfTruman Statement]. Offi-
cials at the U.S. Treasury Department refused to offer a public opinion on the Monetary
Act during congressional debates. As noted in Truman's discourse, "we do not have a view
on whether dollarization is advisable in general." Id.
3. Official Dollarization in Latin America: Hearing on Monetaty Stability in Latin
America Before the Domestic and Int'l Monetary Policy Subcomm. of the House Banking
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rier -how to equitably share the seigniorage revenue earned by
the United States upon printing the dollars needed to replace the
local currency in the dollarizing nation- is resolved by the In-
ternational Monetary Stability Act (the "Monetary Act"). By es-
tablishing this seigniorage-sharing mechanism, the Monetary Act
is designed to induce dollarization at a time when a country en-
joys both political and economic stability, thereby avoiding uni-
lateral dollarization by nations in dire straits, which causes in-
numerable problems for the United States. As one economic
expert explains, "[t]he dollarization issue is much too important
for the U.S. to stand by passively. If the U.S. refuses to take a
position, dollarization will continue to be considered only by
countries in crisis, rather than being an option they consider
during relatively stable times."' In addition to circumventing po-
tential problems imposed by other countries, the Monetary Act
would render numerous direct benefits for the United States, in-
cluding increased trade with the dollarized nation(s), reduced
currency risk for U.S. investors, fortification of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, and support for current U.S. foreign
policy.5 While the U.S. government publicly accepted the ration-
ale for the Monetary Act when it was first introduced in 1999,
this bill was not enacted then because the presidential admini-
stration at that time claimed that such legislation was not
"ripe."' While the Monetary Act may have been slightly "green"
when originally introduced, due to a number of circumstances
that have changed since this time, this legislation is now so ripe
that overlooking it again will inevitably generate a spoilage
prejudicial to, in particular, the United States and Mexico.
A formidable ally, neighbor and commercial trading partner
with the United States for many years, Mexico is now seriously
considering adoption of the dollar. As explained in great detail
later in this article, successful dollarization of this country would
be highly beneficial to the United States and Mexico alike. With
and Financial Services Comm., 106"' Cong. (2000) (statement of Michael Gavin, UBS
Warburg, LLC) [hereinafter Hearing/Gavin Statement].
4. The Int'l Monetary Stability Act: Hearing on S. Res. 1879 Before the Subcomm. on
Econ. Policy of the Senate Banking Comm., 106" Cong. (2000) (opening statement of
Connie Mack, Subcomm. Chairman).
5. See Connie Mack, Dollarization Bill Would Export Price Stability, THE HILL, Apr. 12,
2000, at 36. It is fair for people to question the potential benefits of supporting the bill:
"[Elconomic policy is never a matter of altruism, and it's only fair to ask: Why should the
United States seek to share its currency with the rest of the world?" Id.
6. See generally S. REP. No. 106-354, (2000).
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such a strong economy and large population, however, Mexico is
reluctant to dollarize without a seigniorage-sharing accord. For
this reason, the Monetary Act now epitomizes timeliness and,
therefore, should be enacted as soon as possible. Fortunately, al-
though the original sponsor of this bill has retired, other politi-
cians have expressed an interest in reintroducing the Monetary
Act during the 108th Congress.7
This article advocating the enactment of the Monetary Act
to, among other things, trigger the dollarization of Mexico is or-
ganized in the following manner. Fist, the concept of dollariza-
tion in its many forms (i.e., unofficial, semi-official and official) is
briefly explained. Next, the second section provides an analysis
of the Monetary Act designed to allow nations to share seignior-
age revenues derived from printing currency, thereby facilitating
dollarization in regions such as Latin America. Subsequently,
section three features numerous arguments in favor of dollariza-
tion, both for the United States and Mexico. This section, in par-
ticular, explains the not-so-well-known advantages of dollariza-
tion for these two nations, while revealing the shortcomings of
the arguments typically embraced by dollarization opponents. In
the fourth section, this article argues that, unlike at the time of
its initial introduction, changed circumstances in Mexico make
the Monetary Act "ripe" for enactment. In doing so, this section
identifies the major Mexican groups engaged in the dollarization
debate, uncovers the weaknesses of the arguments used by the
government to postpone the dollarization decision, and suggests
that enactment of the Monetary Act could suffice to persuade
Mexico's new president Vicente Fox to seriously consider dollar-
izing his nation within a short time. Based on the irrefutable
benefits of the Monetary Act for all countries involved, this artic-
cle concludes that this bill should be approved at the earliest op-
portunity.
II. DOLLARIZATION DEFINED
Until recently, the concept of dollarization received minimal
attention because, according to the traditional view, it was
7. Audio Tape: Telephone Interview with Steve Patterson, Staff Director for the Senate
Econ. Policy Subcommittee, Office of Sen. James Bunning (Apr. 26, 2001) (on file with
author).
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deemed a "political impossibility."'  In recent years, however,
several factors have created an interest in dollarization, includ-
ing (i) in Europe, the introduction of the common currency known
as the euro, (ii) in Latin America, Argentina's relatively success-
ful experience with the use of the dollar and the currency-board
type system implemented in 1991, and (iii) worldwide, the reper-
cussions generated by the financial crises in Mexico (1994-1995),
East Asia (1997-1998), Russia (1998) and Brazil (1998-1999). 9
In broad terms, dollarization can be divided into three main
categories. First, Unofficial Dollarization occurs when residents
of a country, in the absence of formal government approval of the
practice, retain a large share of financial wealth in assets de-
nominated in dollars. This currency retention comes in a variety
of forms such as (i) dollar-based bonds or other noncash assets,
(ii) dollars in the form of cash, (iii) dollar deposits in domestic
banks, or (iv) dollar deposits in foreign banks. Despite attempts
by some governments to conceal such information, Unofficial
Dollarization is significant in many developing countries. In fact,
according to a study conducted by the International Monetary
Fund, in 1995 over thirty percent of these countries registered
"high" levels of dollarization. '° Such incidence of Unofficial Dol-
larization did not occur instantly; rather, it is the result of a
three-step process.1 Unofficial Dollarization is ordinarily a
gradual progression that may, though, be accelerated by an in-
crease in economic instability of a nation. In other words, as "the
probability of devaluation rises ... more citizens shun the na-
tional currency in favor of the historically more stable US dol-
8. See STAFF OF S. J. ECON. COMM., 106TH CONG., REPORT ON BASICS OF
DOLLARIZATION (Comm. Print 2000) [hereinafter BASICS OF DOLLARIZATION] (expressing
the views of the author, Kurt Schuler, Senior Economist to the Comm. Chairman).
9. Zeljko Bogetic, Official or Full Dollarization: Current Experience and Issues, CATO
JOURNAL, FALL 2000, at 179, 180, available at http://users.erols.com/ kur-
rency/bogdllr.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2000).
10. See BASICS OF DOLLARIZATION, supra note 8. The Federal Reserve System esti-
mates that foreigners hold between fifty-five and seventy percent (approximately 300 bil-
lion) of all dollars currently in circulation. BASics OF DOLLARIZATION, supra note 8.
11. See BASICS OF DOLLARIZATION, supra note 8. During the first stage, "asset substitu-
tion," residents hold foreign bonds and deposits abroad to store value for protection
against loss of wealth through inflation in domestic currency or outright confiscations. Id.
"Currency substitution," the second stage, entails residents holding large amounts of for-
eign currency in domestic banks, if legally permitted. During this period, while everyday
expenses (wages, taxes, groceries, bills, etc.) are still paid in domestic currency, major
items are often handled in foreign currency. Id. In the final stage, residents actually be-
gin to think in terms of the foreign currency and local prices become indexed to the ex-
change rate. Id.
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The second category is known as Semi-Official Dollarization,
which is another name for a bi-monetary system wherein two dis-
tinct currencies (i.e., the dollar and the local currency) are both
legally recognized and circulate simultaneously. Presently, more
than a dozen countries have adopted this financial structure.8 In
these nations, the dollar is considered legal tender and may
dominate bank deposits, yet it is still subordinate to the domestic
currency in terms of paying wages, taxes and everyday expenses.
Similar to countries with Unofficial Dollarization, these nations
retain their central banks and, therefore, are able conduct their
own monetary policy.
The third category, Official Dollarization, contemplates an
absolute monetary union between at least two nations. In such
cases, the imported foreign country (i.e., the dollar) is converted
into full legal tender and the former domestic currency, if any, is
relegated to a subordinate role.1 4 To date, approximately thirty
nations comprised of nearly 10.5 million persons have adopted
this economic structure." The most famous of these is Panama, a
country that formally sanctioned the use of the dollar in 1903
and has served as a prototype for many emerging nations. 6 If a
12. See Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Responding to Global Crises: Dollarization in
Latin America, ECONSOUTH (Second Quarter 1999) available at http://www. frbat-
lanta.org/publica/econ south/1999/q2/index.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2000) [hereinafter
Responding to Global Crises].
13. See generally Bogetic, supra note 9, at 185. Among those nations with bi-monetary
systems are the Bahamas, Bhutan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti, Isle of Man, Lao, Lesotho,
Liberia, Luxembourg, Namibia and Tajikistan. See id.at 186-87.
14. Id.; see, e.g., Ley Fundamental para la Transformacifn Econ6mica del Ecuador, Ley
No. 4, Cap. I, Art. 1, R.O. Supp., 13 de Marzo del 2000 [The Fundamental Law for the
Economic Transformation of Ecuador, ch. 1, art. 1 (2000)] . In Ecuador, for example, al-
though the dollar is used as the principal currency, the Ecuadorian currency known as
sucres will continue to be acceptable in coin form for use in small purchases.
15. See BASICS OF DOLLARIZATION, supra note 8. The nations that have Officially Dol-
larized include Andorra, Caicos Island, Cocos Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Greenland,
Guam, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Niue, Nor-
folk Islands, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Panama, Pitcairn Island, Puerto Rico,
Saint Helena, Samoa, San Marino, Tokelau, Turks Island, Tuvalu, Vatican City and the
Virgin Islands. Id. Since the publication of this article by Schuler, El Salvador and Ec-
uador have also officially dollarized, thereby raising the total to approximately twenty
five million persons. Id.
16. See STAFF OF SENATE JOINT ECON. COMM., 105TH CONG., ENCOURAGING OFFICIAL
DOLLARIZATION IN EMERGING MARKETS (Comm. Print 1999), available at
http:senate.gov/-jec/dollarization.htm (last visited April 4, 2000) [hereinafter
ENCOURAGING OFFICIAL DOLLARIZATION] (expressing the views of the author, Kurt
Schuler, Senior Economist to the Comm. Chairman). Since 1903, Panama has been offi-
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country is truly dollarized, in addition to replacing its domestic
currency with the dollar, its central bank is essentially abolished.
Consequently, the nation's ability to implement an independent
monetary policy is also eliminated." Notwithstanding this ap-
parent loss of economic autonomy, according to experts, countries
that adopt Official Dollarization and allow full participation by
foreign financial institutions in the local market become tightly
integrated into large financial markets. 8 Moreover, those na-
tions that are Officially Dollarized become part of a unified cur-
rency zone within which prices of similar goods originating in ei-
ther country are kept within a narrow range. Despite this
relative price stability, the Officially Dollarized country loses the
ability to respond to economic shocks by altering the exchange
rate of its currency, and is obligated to adopt alternative meth-
ods to mitigate unexpected financial changes, including (i) fos-
tering flows of capital into or out of the country to offset the
shock, (ii) reducing the government budget or (iii) increasing
prices and lowering wages."'
cially dollarized, and no central bank or centralized foreign reserves exist. The national
currency (the balboa) continues to circulate as coins. Id. According to the author, as a re-
sult of dollarization, "[diespite large inflows and outflows of capital, Panama has avoided
the booms and busts that have resulted from such flows in other Latin American coun-
tries." Id. In addition, the inflation rate between 1971 and 1997 averaged just 3.5 per-
cent, which is lower than the rate in the United States or in any other Latin American
nation. Id. See also Juan Luis Moreno-Villalaz, Lessons From the Monetary Experience of
Panama: A Dollar Economy with Financial Integration, CATO JOURNAL, Winter 1999, at
421; see also Ilan Goldfajn & Gino Olivares, Full Dollarization: The Case of Panama, in
The Choice of Currency Arrangements in Latin America and the Caribbean (LCSPR, Eco-
nomic Management Group ed., 2001), available at http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org
/laclacinfoclient.nsfgO/188de6b8142bb478852569540076f3dl/$FILE/dollarpan.pdf. last
visited (Sep 1, 2001).
17. See ENCOURAGING OFFICIAL DOLLARIZATION, supra note 16. The concept of an "in-
dependent monetary policy" means that a country has a domestic central bank that,
among other things, issues domestic currency. Id. Some economic theories suggest that
an independent monetary policy allows a country to control interest rates, money supply
and exchange rates with the goal of avoiding drastic fluctuations. Id. See also Jeff Frie-
den, Currency Politics: Dollarization and Other Dilemmas, DRCLAS NEWS (Harvard Uni-
versity, Cambridge, Mass.), Fall 1999, available at http://www.fas.harvard.edu/
-drclaspages/tabpages/publicationsfnewsletters/fall99/frieden.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2000).
18. See BASICS OF DOLLARIZATION, supra note 8. In the opinion of Sen. Mack, "[tihe
ability to switch dollar funds without currency risk between the domestic economy and
the rest of the world tends to minimize the booms and busts that often arise in countries
having independent monetary policies and financial systems not well-integrated into the
world system." Id.
19. See id. Senator Connie Mack acknowledges that absorbing economic shocks without
the traditional instrument of choice in Latin America (i.e., exchange-rate modifications) is
difficult. According to Mack, "[a] country experiencing 'real' economic shock ultimately
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This article focuses on official dollarization, a process that
will be greatly facilitated by the Monetary Act, which is exam-
ined in detail in the following section.
III. MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE MONETARY ACT
The dollarization initiative of Argentina in the early 1990s
prompted widespread debate regarding whether the United
States should encourage, discourage or remain neutral toward of-
ficial dollarization in Latin America. Two such contentious de-
bates occurred in the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, both of
which served to convince Senator Connie Mack of Florida that, in
light of the circumstances, U.S. support of official dollarization in
this region would prove beneficial to all parties involved." Ac-
cordingly, on November 8, 1999, Senator Mack introduced the
Monetary Act, whose express purpose was "[t]o promote interna-
tional monetary stability and to share seigniorage with officially
dollarized countries."
21
In terms of general findings, the Monetary Act is based on
the premise that economic stability is a prerequisite for strong
long-term growth and heightened standards of living.22 Many
emerging-market countries like those in Latin America, unfortu-
nately, lack this indispensable monetary stability, which has
generated economic problems such as financial fragility and vola-
tile inflation and interest rates.23 In an attempt to overcome
these difficulties and foster monetary stability, several Latin
American countries have introduced a variety of mechanisms
such as fixed exchange rates, crawling pegs, freely floating ex-
change rates and managed floats.24 While these efforts have pro-
has to adjust by experiencing 'real' pain or gain." Id.
20. Dollarization debates were held by (i) the Subcommittee on Economic Policy on and
(ii) the Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance on April 22, 1999.
21. Rep. Paul Ryan of Wisconsin introduced a companion bill to the Monetary Act in the
House of Representatives (H.R. 3493) on November 18, 1999. Since the Monetary Act was
never submitted to a vote during the year of its introduction, Senator Mack sponsored the
bill again on February 24, 2000. The former was entitled the International Monetary
Stability Act of 1999 and the latter, with little surprise, was called the International
Monetary Stability Act of 2000. In this paper, both bills are indiscriminately referred to
as the "Monetary Act."
22. Monetary Act § 2(a)(1) (1999).
23. See id. § 2(a)(2).
24. Nancy Neiman Auberach & Aldo Flores-Quiroga, The Political Economy of Dollari-
zation in Mexico, in DOLLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAS? 1, 4 (James W. Dean et al. eds.,
2001). In Mexico, since the economic crisis that plagued this nation in 1976, the govern-
[Vol. 32:3
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duced temporary periods of economic growth and lower inflation,
eventually this initial improvement is followed by severe balance-
of-payments problems, drastic devaluations of the local currency
and a substantial decrease in international reserves.25 To elimi-
nate these problems and provide a solution with greater longev-
ity, the Monetary Act establishes the rules and procedures re-
lated to the implementation of official dollarization in, among
others, Latin American countries such as Mexico.2
With respect to benefits for those nations that opt to dollar-
ize in accordance with the Monetary Act, the dividends are mul-
tiple. The Monetary Act, for example, is designed to (i) reduce in-
flation and interest rates to the U.S. levels by importing the
monetary stability that a country has failed to achieve independ-
ently"7 , (ii) impede Latin American governments from printing
domestic currency to finance government programs, thereby cul-
tivating fiscal discipline ' , and (iii) create more profound financial
markets by facilitating the use of the currency that is already
employed on a daily basis when conducting financial transac-
tions." Together these changes endeavor to "increase long-term
economic growth and raise living standards in emerging market
countries," thereby accomplishing the express purpose of the
Monetary Act."0
ment has introduced all four of these methods to no avail. See id. According to the
authors, as a result of the recurrent economic-policy failures, "a strong domestic and in-
ternational demand for Mexico's adoption of sustainable and credible stabilization meas-
ures has therefore surfaced." See id.
25. Monetary Act § 2(a)(3) (1999).
26. Kurt Schuler & Robert Stein, The Mack Dollarization Plan: An Analysis 4-5 (March
6, 2000) (paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas conference entitled Dol-
larization: A Common Currency for the Americas?, available at http/www.dallasfed.org/
htm/dallas/events/dollarspeech.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2001). In the opinion of the
authors, one dollarization bill applicable to all countries is preferable to passing a bill for
each separate country (e.g. Mexico) for the following reasons: (i) one country may manage
to negotiate a more favorable deal in terms of percentage of seigniorage to be shared than
another, thus causing diplomatic problems, (ii) a dollarization bill on a particular country
would inevitably become a target for all issues related to that country, thereby impeding
progress and triggering debate on impertinent issues, (iii) if a country declared that its
dollarization was approved contingent upon the enactment of an appropriate law in the
United States, the uncertainty caused by delays by the US legislature could destabilize
such country's financial markets, and (iv) separate bilateral negotiations would require
enormous amounts of time. Id.
27. Monetary Act § 2(a)(6) (1999).
28. See id. § 2(a)(7).
29. See id. § 2(a)(8).
30. See id. § 2(a)(9).
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Likewise, the Monetary Act declares that the facilitation of
official dollarization in other nations would prove advantageous
for the United States for several reasons. First, by increasing
trade with and investment in the dollarized nations, the result-
ing economic growth would allow a decrease in the need for for-
eign assistance from the United States, a habitual benefactor to
emerging-market economies.3' In other words, by helping Latin
American nations to strengthen and stabilize their economies vis-
a-vis dollarization, the need for U.S. taxpayers to bail out these
countries from currency-related dilemmas will be drastically re-
duced.32 Second, dollarization is designed to spur economic
growth and enhance the purchasing power of Latin American
consumers, thereby creating more fruitful markets for the sale of
U.S. goods. Third, encouraging official dollarization would sup-
plement continuing efforts by the United States to fortify the in-
ernational financial architecture.3
Regarding the possibility of additional responsibilities for the
United States as a consequence of facilitating official dollariza-
tion, the Monetary Act explicitly clarifies that the U.S. role will
be quite limited. The Monetary Act provides, in particular, that
the U.S. Federal Reserve System will not be obligated to act as
the lender-of-last-resort to the dollarized countries, to consider
the economic conditions of dollarized countries when determining
monetary policy, or to supervise the financial institutions in dol-
larized countries.'
Procedurally, the Monetary Act establishes that the US Sec-
retary of the Treasury may, at his/her discretion, certify a coun-
try as officially dollarized after evaluating a number of factors,
including whether the applicant has (a) stopped issuing local cur-
rency, (b) destroyed all materials used in producing the local cur-
rency, (c) eliminated a substantial portion of the local currency
still in circulation, (d) formally terminated the local currency as
31. See id. § 2(a)(10).
32. See S. REP. No. 106-354 (2000).
33. Monetary Act § 2(a)(14) (1999). See also Reforming the International Financial Ar-
chitecture - Progress Through 2000, IMF ISSUES BRIEF (International Monetary Fund,
New York, N.Y.), Mar. 9, 2001, available at
http:/www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2001030901.htm, (last visited July 28, 2001). This
report indicates that after the financial disasters in the 1990s, the international commu-
nity of which the United States forms a part has been implementing a policy framework
designed to "make crises less frequent and less painful in the future." Id.
34. Monetary Act § 2(b) (1999).
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legal tender, (e) recognized the US dollar as sole legal tender, (f)
stopped accepting local currency, except in exchange for dollars,
(g) significantly redenominated the country's prices, assets and
liabilities in US dollars, (h) opened its banking system to foreign
competition or complied with international banking standards,
and (i) consulted the US Secretary of the Treasury to determine
whether the nation is a "good candidate" for official dollariza-
tion 5 While these certification criteria may appear innocuous
and unintrusive at first glance, the broad discretion granted to
the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury coupled with his/her ability to
revoke certification if the conditions suitable for dollarization
cease to exist reveal the Monetary Act's reticence to relinquish
any real control to the dollarizing nations. In the words of one
commentator, "[t]he Secretary's latitude should encourage coun-
tries interested in official dollarization to cooperate fully with the
United States."36
Once certified, the actual dollarization process would occur
in the following manner. The country desirous of dollarizing
would have its central bank take the assets that back its local
currency (e.g. securities, gold, bonds, etc.) and convert them into
U.S. Treasury securities in the international financial markets.
The central bank would then use the U.S. Treasury securities to
literally buy dollars from the U.S. Federal Reserve. As a final
step, the country would utilize the newly-acquired dollars to re-
purchase and then permanently retire the local currency. If the
country manages to remain dollarized for a minimum of ten
years, the Monetary Act sets forth a formula by which such coun-
try can obtain payments to rebate up to eighty five percent of the
seigniorage earned by the United States during the ten year pe-
riod.3"
IV. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE MONETARY ACT
A. Potential Disadvantages of the Monetary Act for
Mexico
While this article advocates the adoption of the Monetary
35. Id. § 3.
36. See S. REP. No. 106-354 (2000).
37. Monetary Act § 4 (1999).
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Act to, inter alia, foment dollarization in Mexico, in order to fully
develop this proposition it is necessary to recognize the potential
negative ramifications that such action could trigger in this Latin
American nation. In the words of one expert, although dollariza-
tion "seems almost too good to be true... there are several
hitches," the majority of which are addressed below." As this ar-
ticle will demonstrate, at first glance each argument in opposi-
tion to dollarization appears tenable. When subjected to intense
scrutiny, however, the credibility of each assertion is severely
undermined."5
1. Mexico May Lose Seigniorage Revenues
The concept of seigniorage may be defined as the revenue
that a country derives from issuing its currency, i.e., the differ-
ence between the cost of putting money into circulation and the
value of the goods such money will buy. For instance, in the
United States, a one dollar bill costs approximately three cents to
print, yet the government can use it to buy one dollar worth of
goods. Thus, if the bill circulates indefinitely, the seigniorage
earned is ninety seven cents. In addition to this initial economic
gain, when persons hold dollars, they create seigniorage for the
U.S. government in the sense that such government is not obli-
gated to pay interest to the holder, as it would with a government
bond or other interest-bearing instrument. Possessing dollar
bills, therefore, is functionally equivalent to granting the U.S.
government an interest-free loan.4"
In the case of Mexico, the cost of introducing dollars can be
viewed in one of two ways. On one hand, the expense of initially
obtaining the dollar-denominated bills and coins necessary to re-
place the peso in circulation may be considered a one-time "stock
cost." On the other hand, this expense could be characterized as
a "flow cost," or a continual loss of seigniorage each year. Irre-
38. Hausmarn, Five Currencies, supra note 1, at 76.
39. Rudi Dornbusch, Fewer Monies, Better Monies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 238, 238-242
(2001). In reference to the arguments against dollarization, this author remains uncon-
vinced, stating that "o]n the surface, each argument is persuasive; [but] on closer scru-
tiny none really is." Id.
40. See ENCOURAGING OFFICIAL DOLLARIZATION IN EMERGING MARKETS, supra note 16.
The Federal Reserve Board estimates that foreigners now hold between fifty-five to sev-
enty percent of the total dollars, thereby providing the U.S. government approximately
$15 billion per year in seigniorage. Id.
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spective of its categorization, according to some experts, the
seigniorage issue should not constitute a significant obstacle to
dollarization in Mexico for three main reasons. First, despite its
population of approximately one hundred million and a sizable
economy, the revenue that the Mexican government is really in
jeopardy of losing by not printing currency locally is minimal."
Second, any loss of seigniorage incurred by Mexico could be miti-
gated by the Monetary Act, whereby Mexico could receive rebates
of up to eighty five percent of the seigniorage. Third, the seign-
iorage revenue forsaken by Mexico is, in effect, a minuscule price
to pay for the benefits that the monetary stability from dollariza-
tion would generate. In the words of one Latin American finan-
cial wizard, "[tihe seigniorage paid to the United States would be
the price of the services of a stable currency. 42
2. Central Bank as Lender-of-Last-Resort
Historically, in times of extreme financial pressures, the cen-
tral banks throughout Latin America have attempted to meet the
liquidity demands of local banks and other financial institutions
by providing loans predicated on the printing of additional cur-
rency. At such times, the central bank acts as the "lender-of-last
resort" since, amid such desperate circumstances, other potential
lenders traditionally refuse to offer swift assistance. As ex-
plained previously, true dollarization entails the eradication of
the central bank which, in turn, eliminates the government's ca-
pacity to create new currency in times of dire need.43
41. See Hausmann, Five Currencies, supra note 1, at 76. Statistics indicate that seign-
iorage in most countries accounts for only five percent of the Gross Domestic Product. See
id. Accordingly, Hausmann suggests that "this is not a huge amount, and the benefits of
adopting a supranational currency may well exceed the costs." See id.; see also CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK, (2000), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mx.html#Econ (last visited Apr. 18,
2001) [hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK]. In 2000, Mexico's GDP was approximately $865
billion. Id.
42. See Official Dollarization in Emerging-Market Countries: Hearing Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Econ. Policy and the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Fin. of the Senate Bank-
ing Comm., 105' Cong. (1999) (testimony of Manuel E. Hinds, Former Minister of Fin., El
Salvador) [hereinafter Hearing/Hinds Testimony].
43. Andrbs Velasco, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEv., EXCHANGE-
RATE POLICIES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? WHAT Do WE
STILL NOT KNOW?, at 4-10, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/MDPB/G24/5 (2000). The lender-of-
last-resort as the institution prepared to provide instant credit to local banks in the event
that they experience an unanticipated demand for liquidity, such as in the case of a "bank
run," wherein those possessing a significant amount of a particular bank's funds decide to
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It is arguable that abolishing the central bank as the lender-
of-last-resort should not prove troublesome for Mexico for several
reasons. First, several experts have harshly criticized central
banks in Latin America in general, arguing that such institutions
generate "inflation, corruption and poverty" and, therefore,
should have been abolished years ago if certain economists and
politicians in this region had acted rationally." Opponents of
central banks suggest, moreover, that these financial entities are
ill-equipped to serve as a lender during critical periods because,
instead of simply recognizing the fact that a certain incidence of
bank closure is inevitable to a the deficiency of available credit,
they are inclined to conceal the fact with a money-creation proc-
ess that eventually triggers the destruction of the local currency
and formerly healthy banks, too. For this reason, such experts
claim that using central banks as a lender-of-last-resort is simply
"failed or failing banking policy."'5 Second, eliminating this local
lender-of-last-resort should not be problematic due to the fact
that alternative arrangements for financing during a crisis may
be made by the Mexican government. While such theories have
been challenged on occasion46, the government could (i) secure
lines of credit from financial institutions abroad, (ii) set aside a
liquid fund to be loaned to local banks during an emergency, (iii)
require high reserve requirements for banks, thereby forcing
these local entities to maintain a high percentage of their depos-
its in liquid US-dollar-denominated instruments, (iv) establish
withdraw such monies hastily due to fears that such funds will become inaccessible or
tremendously devaluated. See id. As lenders-of-last-resort, central banks in Latin Amer-
ica tend to avoid crises of this nature by merely printing additional currency. This ability,
explains Velasco, "disappears under dollarization." Id.
44. Steve H. Hanke, How to Abolish Currency Crises, FORBES, March 20, 2000, at 145.
According to Hanke, logic dictates that the central banks in Latin America should have
been eliminated years ago. However, numerous decision-makers in the region (i.e.
economists and politicians) have acted irrationally, "ignored the incriminating evidence
and sang the glories of national currencies produced by central banks." See id. Such un-
substantiated support of these problematic financial institutions, argues Hanke, is utterly
misdirected: "All this has about as much logic as giving gasoline and matches to an ar-
sonist and complaining about the fires." See id.
45. See Dornbusch, supra note 39.
46. Velasco, supra note 43, at 6. While the ideas for alternative arrangements identi-
fied by experts appear tenable, they remain to a large extent completely untested. Id. For
instance, Velasco acknowledges that encouraging foreign ownership of domestic banks
could represent a feasible solution. Nonetheless, further evidence is necessary to justify
such arguments: "Will Citibank US ride to the rescue every time that Latin or Asian
banks in which it has a ten percent equity stake gets into trouble? Perhaps. But hanging
a whole financial system's health on that conjecture seems risky indeed." id.
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open contingency credit lines with multilateral public institu-
tions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, In-
ter-American Development Bank, etc. or (v) encourage foreign
ownership of domestic banks." Third, the eradication of central
banks as lenders-of-last-resort may actively stimulate increased
financial and administrative discipline since the largest arrow in
its bank-saving quiver (i.e. instant money creation) will be re-
scinded."8
3. Exchange-Rate Flexibility and Economic Sovereignty
In theory, countries benefit from having their own monetary
policy because they can address local economic conditions by
rapidly manipulating/devaluing their local currency, thereby
preparing the economy for external shocks, decreasing the inter-
est rate, and leveling long-term trends in economic growth and
unemployment. 9 In the majority of Latin American countries,
the key weapon in the monetary arsenal has been a flexible ex-
change rate between the national currency and the dollar, which
functions to counteract fluctuations in the economies of these two
countries.5° In spite of the untamed economic volatility in the re-
gion, some experts argue that eradicating exchange-rate flexibil-
ity in favor of dollarization is reckless and untimely, claiming
47. Id.; see also Hearing/Hinds Testimony, supra note 42; see also Ricardo Hausmann et
al., Financial Turmoil and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime, WORKING PAPER NO.400
(Inter-American Development Bank, New York, N.Y.), 1999 (on file with the University of
Miami Inter-American Law Review). Arranging appropriate lines of credit with foreign
banks would be effortless for Latin American countries. With regard to Ecuador, for ex-
ample, the author suggests that even if the United States attempted to restrict this na-
tion's access to the Federal Reserve system, foreign banks would "line up" to furnish the
needed funding, provided that they could secure adequate collateral. Id.
48. See Guillermo A. Calvo & Carlos A. Vegh, Currency Substitution in Developing
Countries, IMF WORKING PAPER 92/40 (International Monetary Fund, New York, N.Y.,
May 1992) (on file with the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review). Propo-
nents of this argument recognize that the introduction of dollarization may not, in prac-
tice, force central banks to completely relinquish its money-creation authority. See id.
The authors explain, in particular, that "critics will have an easy time finding a plethora
of historical examples in which as soon as the domestic financial system threatened to
collapse, rules were relaxed and the system was bailed out - which could lead to, at least,
a temporary abandonment of full dollarization." Id.
49. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ECON. POLICY OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URB. AFFS., 105"' Cong., REPORT ON ISSUES REGARDING DOLLARIZATION
(Comm. Print 1999) (expressing the views of the author, Robert Stein, Staff Director)
[hereinafter ISSUES REGARDING DOLLARIZATION].
50. Jeffrey Sachs & Felipe Larrain, Why Dollarization is More Straitjacket Than Salva-
tion, FOREIGN POLICY, Sept. 22, 1999, at 80.
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that "[dlollarization is an extreme solution to market instability,
applicable in only the most extreme cases. The opposite ap-
proach -a flexible exchange rate between the national currency
and the dollar- is much more prudent for most developing coun-
tries, including those hit by recent crises. '
Notwithstanding such endorsements, many authorities
adopt the opposite stance, pointing out that the flexible regimes
have repeatedly failed throughout Latin America." In particular,
it is argued that recent experiences in the region indicate that
the popularity of floating exchange rates may constitute merely
"another form of charming naivete" since they have failed to (i)
provide autonomy in the determination of interest rates, (ii) fa-
cilitate more stabilizing monetary policies, or (iii) increase the
countries' ability to absorb shocks.53
Opponents of dollarization have espoused two main argu-
ments in their campaign against adoption of this drastic meas-
ure. Such assertions, however, have been frequently refuted.
First, some economists maintain that central banks are neces-
sary to control inflation, decrease interest rates in times of reces-
sion, finance government deficit spending and temporarily sup-
port financially troubled institutions. This premise has been
vehemently rejected by, among others, experts who characterize
the central banks in Latin America as the "Achilles' heel of these
countries" that have historically obstructed true economic ad-
vancement.54 Such ineptitude, it is argued, is so apparent that
51. Id.
52. See ISSUES REGARDING DOLLARIZATION, supra note 49. In Stein's opinion, as op-
posed to counteracting economic shocks, "independent monetary policies have actually
been pro-cyclical, exacerbating the ups and downs of the business cycle." See id.
53. Hausmanm, Five Currencies, supra note 1, at 72. Hausmann claims that past expe-
riences in Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela demonstrate that in reality the exchange
rate was not allowed to move adequately during pivotal economic moments. See id. In-
stead, he argues, they "react by raising interest rates, thereby dramatically worsening the
domestic situation." See id.; see also Steve H. Hanke, Letters to the Editor: The Beauty of
a Parallel Currency, WALL ST. J., Jan.11, 2000, at A27. In the case of Ecuador, for exam-
ple, in an attempt to conserve its foreign reserves, in February 1999 the government al-
lowed the local currency (the sucre) to float, a maneuver that encountered significant dif-
ficulties. See id. During the following year, the Ecuadorian currency lost more than
seventy percent of its value against the dollar, a performance that has provoked repeated
criticisms of the floating exchange policy. See id. As the words of this renowned econo-
mist, "[t]he sucre hasn't floated on a sea of tranquility." Id.
54. See Dale Keiger, The Way According to Hanke, JOHNS HOPKINS MAGAZINE, Septem-
ber 1999, available at http://www.jhu.edu/-jhumag/0999web/hanke.html (last visited
July 28, 2001). In the opinion of economist Steve Hanke, "the banks' records make clear
that they cannot be trusted to make prudent decisions, that they are susceptible to politi-
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virtually all persons, irrespective of their particular knowledge of
economics, realize that the central banks are detrimental to the
local economies." Other advocates of dollarization discredit the
argument that dollarization is unfeasible in the larger economies
of Latin America because of the need for swift adjustments. As
an illustrative case, such experts indicate that all of the states in
the United States are dollarized, notwithstanding the distinct re-
sources and disparate economic cycles of each. 6 Similarly, other
dollarization advocates claim that, in light of the poor historical
performance of the central banks in the region, the removal of
monetary-policy decisions from the central bank is a prudent de-
cision. They state, specifically, that labeling as beneficial the
surrender of authority by the central bank may appear paradoxi-
cal at first glance, "but if the central bank cannot fully commit to
its policy announcements then there is a benefit in taking control
away."5  Sharing this opinion, official US government reports
have negatively assessed the previous performance of many cen-
tral banks in Latin America. With a dose of deference that tends
to disguise the harshness of its actual conclusions, a recent con-
gressional report indicates that the independent monetary poli-
cies in the region commonly "aggravated rather than eased eco-
nomic problems" and constitute "a major source of instability in
many countries."" Still others claim that, despite the consider-
able amount of rhetoric regarding this subject, the monetary-
policy issue has very little practical significance since the central
banks in Latin America rarely achieve an interest rate lower
than that in the United States, which would control the interest
cal pressures and poor judgment and tend to do more harm than good." Id. Based on the-
ses facts, Hanke advocates strict measures: "Put them in a straitjacket ... or abolish
them altogether." Id.
55. See id. Hanke argues that people already know that the central banks are deficient
and, thus, choose to dollarize unofficially. See id. Hanke points out, for instance, that
"[y]ou go to Mexico or Russia and you find that everybody is using greenbacks. They don't
need some damned economist or pedagogue explaining the problem with central banks."
Id.
56. Steve Hanke, Dollarize Now, FORBES, May 3, 1999, at 208. Rejecting the argument
that a nation's size is an impediment to dollarization, the author makes the following
comparison: "There is less to this argument than meets the eye. All fifty states within the
United States are officially dollarized, and some have very large economies. Indeed, Cali-
fornia's economy is larger than Brazil's, which accounts for almost forty-five percent of
Latin America's total economic activity. I have yet to hear calls to establish a central
bank of California." Id.
57. Roberto Chang, Dollarization: A Scorecard, 85 ECON. REV.-FED. RES. BANK OF
ATLANTA 1, 9 (Third Quarter 2000).
58. See S. REP. NO. 106-354 (2000).
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rate upon dollarization."9 With regard to the potential loss of
monetary policy as an impediment to dollarization in Mexico,
various experts have rejected this factor outright, stating that
this is merely a "technocratic argument" that is based on the
popular analogy that dollarization would be equivalent to ampu-
tating an appendage of the economic body. Regardless of the
popularity of this metaphor, it is argued, that this type of "I-
know-much-more-than-you-do policy advice defies the common-
sense logic of radical currency reform."'
The second argument embraced by detractors to dollariza-
tion is that elimination of the central bank would entail surren-
dering a certain degree of national sovereignty. Historically, a
national currency has been symbolic of a country, and the eradi-
cation thereof would thus be tantamount to renouncing a portion
of a nation's autonomy. This perspective, though, is suspect in
the opinion of dollarization advocates for a multiplicity of rea-
sons. For example, several proponents flatly deny the existence
of a relationship between the two factors, claiming that "[t]he
currency of a country has nothing to do with its sovereignty"61
and that identifying a national currency as the quintessential
symbol of sovereignty "inappropriately mixes political concepts
with economic concepts."62 In support of this assertion, support-
ers have developed a list of the other countries that are already
use a foreign currency, emphasizing that they still are, never-
59. See Dornbusch, supra note 39. Dornbusch suggests that the arguments against
dollarization are valid in theory, but lose credibility upon application to real events. See
id. In principle, argues Dornbusch, there might be some scope for deeply undervalued
currencies in Latin America to achieve lower nominal interest rates than those in the
United States, "but achieving such levels of undervaluation is unseen in the region except
in the immediate aftermath of a collapse at which time inflation fears typically abound."
Id. Consequently, Dornbusch concludes that monetary policy debate "is a point with little
practical significance." Id.
60. Dollarization and Monetary Stability in Latin America: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Domestic and Int'l Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking and Fin.
Servs., 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Roberto Salinas Leon, Exec. Dir. of Policy Analy-
sis at TV Azteca) [hereinafter Hearing/Salinas Testimony].
61. See generally JOSE LUIS CORDEIRO, LA SEGUNDA MUERTE DE SUCRE... Y EL
RENACER DEL ECUADOR (1999) (on file with author).
62. Steve H. Hanke & Kurt Schuler, A Monetary Constitution for Argentina: Rules for
Dollarization, 18 CATO JOURNAL 405, 408 (Winter 1999). According to the authors, na-
tional sovereignty is the ability of a government to have freedom in foreign policy and
other international political matters. Id. at 409. It is not, he explains, the ability of a
government to restrict the political or economic freedom of its citizens. See id Thus, "[iun
a market economy, the fundamental concept is not national sovereignty but individual
freedom of choice." Id.
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theless, countries." According to other experts, the essence of
sovereignty is free-will of a country's citizens, not that of the gov-
ernment. 4 Likewise, another Latin American observer postu-
lates that sovereignty, as properly defined, focuses on the auton-
omy of consumers in selecting the most advantageous currency
instead of on the freedom of the government to set monetary pol-
icy. Several polls in Mexico, in fact, indicate that those most
worried about the issue of national sovereignty are the sover-
eigns themselves (i.e. the government officials) and not the citi-
zens.6" In this sense, dollarization actually increases monetary
sovereignty for the dollarizing country. For others, the issue
simply lacks major importance due to the global trend toward
overall economic stability.6 Therefore, despite the nationalistic
ideals so profoundly inculcated in the region, many countries
have finally determined that "the conclusion that the cost of
maintaining a national currency, "no matter how satisfying to
their emotions - has simply become too high to bear."'
63. See INSTITUTO ECUATORIANO DE ECONOMIA POLITICA (IEEP, Guayaquil, Ecuador)
DOLARIZACI6N OFICIAL EN ECUADOR, Jan. 13, 2000, available at
http://www.vonbergen.com/ecuador/Espanol/dolarizacion_oficial.htm (last visited Apr. 22,
2000). The author explains that a Central Bank is not necessary for national sovereignty
since, for instance, Ecuador was already a nation prior to the establishment of this insti-
tution. See id. He contends, furthermore, that the importance of a national currency to
project a national identity is overrated since Panama, a country that implemented dol-
larization nearly a century ago, still enjoys a strong national identity. See id.
64. See generally CORDEIRO, supra note 61. The author claims that "[s]overeignty does
not reside in the currency, rather in the well-being of the citizens. Id. Accordingly, the
only ones at risk of losing their 'sovereignty' with dolarization are "the corrupt politicians
that print inorganic money in order to pay their own salaries." Id. The remainder of the
population, maintains this author, would be more sovereign upon having a better quality
of life linked to the strongest currency in the world. See id.
65. See Judy Shelton & Abel Deltran Del Rio, Monetary Policy and Economic Perform-
ance in Mexico, in MONETARY STABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (Robert A. Mundell &
Paul J. Zak eds., 2001). While addressing the feasibility of a currency union between the
United States and Mexico, this article suggests that government leaders are practically
the only persons concerned about such esoteric issues as the sacredness of national sover-
eignty. See id. The citizens, explains this article, "just want money that works." Id.
66. Hausmann, Five Currencies, supra note 1, at 78. Hausmann suggests that this is-
sue probably appears more important than it is. Id. at 77. Over the past twenty years
monetary authorities have become increasingly independent while narrowing their objec-
tives to focus almost entirely on the achievement of price stability. Id. at 77-78. In the
end, the author reasons, "the monetary authorities' autonomy and accountability are
much more important than their national origins." Id. at 78.
67. Jonathan Peterson, The Buck Does Not Stop Here, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1999, at Al
(quoting Benjamin J. Cohen, UC Santa Barbara). The author suggests that throughout
the region attitudes toward dollarization and the idea of sovereignty are rapidly changing.
Id. Now, claims the author, Latin American opinion leaders are openly discussing that
which earlier was considered unspeakable, i.e., "linking their economies, indeed their fi-
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4. Social Costs
It has been argued that dollarization would have tremendous
social costs since, once a government is deprived of its ability to
use protective measures such as devaluating the local currency,
the public in general, and the working class in particular, will be
the repository of nearly all negative ramifications. According to
one expert, "[a]dopting a common currency such as the U.S. dol-
lar or a newly minted one with the face of Columbus -or for that
matter Ricky Martin- without ensuring the necessary changes in
its institutional and economic structure, including the free
movement of labor into the United States, may easily end up
hindering.., economic development." 8 On this same note, com-
mentators suggest that irrespective of implementation of the
dollar, developing economies like Mexico will inevitably experi-
ence external shocks that require macroeconomic adjustment
programs. Due to the fact that the option to modify the exchange
rate is abolished under dollarization, the shocks will most likely
by absorbed by reducing domestic wages and raising prices. As a
result of the "monopolistic competition and rigidity of labor laws
in the region," such changes would generate political and social
instability. Under dollarization, then, it is conceivable that the
burden of macroeconomic adjustments will disproportionally
prejudice the working class and the underemployed. 9
As with the previous arguments against dollarization, this
nancial destinies, to the very symbol of Yankee capitalism, the dollar." Id.; see also David
J. Rothkopf, In Ecuador and Elsewhere, It's Change For a Dollar, WASH. POST, Jan. 30,
2000, at B2. Rothkopf argues that, "in essence, the global marketplace is already dollar-
ized" and the tension begins only when countries view national identity as being linked to
sovereignty; whether the countries allow their currencies to float freely in the market or
peg them to an existing currency such as the dollar, the author claims that "they have to
face a new reality of the global marketplace. Their local currencies are a kind of figment
of their national imaginations that dissolves once you cross their borders. Any transac-
tion outside the country must be made in another currency." Id.; but cf. Hearing/Salinas
Testimony, supra note 60 (countering the argument that relinquishing the peso is tanta-
mount to losing a portion of the Mexican national identity, by emphasizing that such no-
tions are unrealistic in light of current circumstances: "This political argument falls flat
in the face of a poor track record in maintaining the value of the currency. There is no
basis for patriotic pride in high interest rates and a cumulative inflation rate of 275,000
percent in one generation.").
68. See Juan Carlos Moreno Brid, Dollarization in Latin America: Is it Desirable?,
DRCLAS NEWS (Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.), Fall 1999, available at
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/-drclas/pages/tabpages/publications/newsletters/fal199/
moreno.htm. (last visited July 29, 2001).
69. See id.
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too is vehemently refuted. Contrary to the position that elimina-
tion of the peso will result in tremendous social costs in Mexico, it
is possible that the lower interest rates available in Mexico gen-
erated by dollarization will make obtaining a mortgage more fea-
sible. In the words of one observer, "[h]igh interest rates means
Mexican families can't do something that Americans take for
granted: get a mortgage." Urging an end to unfounded "Mexico
bashing," commentators further argue that in the long run, far
from prejudicing the Mexican working class, dollarization will ac-
tually create thousands of jobs, advance labor standards, raise
wages and improve overall living standards in the country. °
5. Ancillary Costs
Finally, apart from the potential disadvantages listed previ-
ously, dollarization involves two additional costs. Mexico must
first bear the expense of converting all prices, computer pro-
grams, cash registers, vending machines, etc. to be compatible
with the dollar. Second, legal and transactional costs associated
with revising contracts or refinancing will be incurred by the
government and individuals alike. Such conversion costs,
though, are significantly mitigated since the amount may be am-
ortized over a long period due to the virtual irreversibility of
dollarization.7"
B. Advantages of the Monetary Act for Mexico
Notwithstanding the potentially detrimental aspects of dol-
70. Walter Russell Mead, How U.S. Can Rebuild Mexico, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2000, at
Mi.
71. See Dollarization as Diet: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Policy
and the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urb. Affs., 105th Cong. (1999) (statement of Catherine L. Mann, Senior Fellow, Inst.
for Int'l Econ.) available at http://www.iie.com/PAPERS/mann0499.htm. (last visited Apr.
21, 2000). Mann argues that dollarization should not be transformed into a fad diet, but a
change of long-term lifestyle. See id. She explains, in particular, that "lp]olicy-initiated
dollarization is like wiring your mouth shut to lose weight. It is effective in the short-run,
but unless you undertake life-style changes (eating habits, exercise) you are not a health-
ier individual, just a thinner one. Moreover, once you have achieved your desired new
weight, you'll want to take off the braces and eat something besides a liquid diet. Un-
wiring your mouth, de-dollarizing[,] is very difficult since you can't be sure... that you
won't go back to the old habits. Similarly, once dollarized by policy, changing the regime
to regain monetary autonomy simply may not be possible. In order to get the benefits, even
if over-rated, you have to forswear ever changing." Id. (emphasis added).
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larization set forth above, implementing this economic transfor-
mation in accordance with the Monetary Act will undoubtedly
benefit Mexico in numerous manners. First, adopting the dollar
reduces the risk of a sporadic currency devaluation which, in
turn, makes the country more appealing to foreign investors.
The credibility of Latin American currencies, especially the mi-
nor ones, is quite limited. This is evidenced by the fact that none
of these countries has created long-term debt markets denomi-
nated in local currency, the result of which is that firms find
themselves at a pivotal juncture with two equally-unappealing
options: (i) borrow in dollars and be exposed to exchange-rate
mismatches or (ii) borrow in local currencies and risk maturity
mismatches and liquidity crises.2 Second, a reduction in the in-
flation level will be a natural byproduct of dollarization. In com-
parison to advanced economies, inflation in Latin America has
been 100 times more volatile, a phenomena largely attributable
to unstable economic policies.73 Upon dollarizing, this rampant
inflation so notorious throughout the region will be stabilized. 4
Similarly, as a third benefit, dollarization will lead to a decrease
in interest rates since these usually contain a premium for an-
ticipated inflation or devaluation. 5 According to experts, these
benefits are intertwined and thus difficult to appreciate indi-
72. See Peter Bate, Dollars for Everyone?, IDBAMtRICA, Jan-Feb. 2000, available at
http://www.iadb.orgfidbamerica/Archive/stories/1999/eng/e699h.htm. (last visited Feb. 19,
2001) (comments of IDB chief economist, Ricardo Hausmann, during seminar titled "New
Initiatives to Tackle International Financial Turmoil.").
73. See Issues Regarding Dollarization, supra note 49. From 1970 to 1998, consumer
price inflation averaged as follows: Argentina (158%), Brazil (143%), Chile (51%), Mexico
(34%), Peru (108%) and Venezuela (25%). Id.
74. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ECON. POLICY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URB. AFFS., 106TH CONG., REPORT ENTITLED "CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
DOLLARIZATION" (Comm. Print 1999) [hereinafter CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO DOLLARIZATION]
(expressing the views of the author, Robert Stein). Stein suggests that a decrease in in-
flation hastens overall economic growth by increasing local savings, reducing interests
rates and increasing foreign direct investment. See id.; See also Schuler & Stein, supra
note 26, at 5. Schuler and Stein predict that dollarization will reduce inflation "to single
digits from the double-digit levels that now exist in Latin America and elsewhere." Id.
75. See Dollarization in Emerging-Market Econs. and Its Policy Implications for the
United States: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Policy and the Subcomm. on
Int'l Trade and Fin. of the Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urb. Affs., 106'
Cong. (1999) (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Director, Inst. for Int'l Econ.) available at
http://www.iie.coml PAPBRS/bergsten0499.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
Hearing/Bergsten Statement]. Dollarization offers the following three main benefits: (i)
provides greater credibility to a nations's commitment to eternally forgo the option to de-
valuate, (ii) it assures that the nation will import stable prices and lower interest rates
from the US, and (iii) lowers transaction costs, which, in turn, promotes further long-term
integration with the US economy. Id.
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vidually. They explain, for instance, that the tacit irrevocability
of dollarization holds the promise of lower interest and inflation
rates, higher levels of economic activity, greater financial stabil-
ity, and deeper financial markets."6 A fourth major advantage
derived from officially adopting the dollar is that the transaction
costs normally associated with commercial deals involving the
United States are eliminated. Currently, a business transaction
between the countries is a two-step process, whereby all pesos
must first be converted into dollars, or vice versa. By utilizing
the same currency, the costs related to the obligatory currency
conversion are eliminated." The increased transparency with
which the Mexican government and its financial institutions will
function constitutes the fifth benefit of dollarization. 5 As one of
the most powerful Latin American countries to seriously consider
dollarization, Mexico is being closely scrutinized by experts on a
global level. This degree of vigilance will undoubtedly improve
the clarity of governmental policy-making and the efficacy of fi-
nancial institutions, which, like other entities in Mexico, have
been criticized for their inefficiency and susceptibility to corrup-
tion.79 As one expert explains, "[t]he transparency in the new
monetary system would give impetus to fiscal and structural re-
form, since a policy mistake (e.g., a large deficit) could no longer
be 'hidden' with monetary tinkering (e.g., artificially expanding
the money supply to finance public largess.) So dollarization
would invite open international scrutiny."0 Sixth, the stability
generated by dollarization will continue to facilitate Mexico's ex-
ports to the United States and other destinations. A significant
percentage of Mexico's revenue is derived from exports. For in-
stance, according to recent governmental reports, this country
76. See Hearingflruman Statement, supra note 2.
77. Schuler & Stein, supra note 26, at 5.
78. Id.
79. See generally Luz Estella Nagle, Latin America in the Twenty-First Century: The
Cinderella of Government - Judicial Reform in Latin America, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
345(2000); see also A Pact With the Angels, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2001. According to this
article, bribery is endemic in Mexican society because "[w]hen laws and regulations are
complex, bureaucracy is tortuous, and the wages of minor officials are low, it is far
cheaper to bribe than to be honest [and flew Mexicans can resist the temptation." Id. To
rectify this situation, President Fox has instituted several initiatives, including (i) form-
ing an inter-ministerial commission to coordinate anti-corruption policies, (ii) creating a
civic "anti-sleaze" council, and (iii) executing an anti-corruption pact with the private sec-
tor. Id.
80. Roberto Salinas-Le6n, Mexico, the "D" Word and the Stabilization Imperative, in
DOLLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAS? 7 (James W. Dean and Steven Globerman eds., 2001).
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generates approximately $137 billion annually from the sale of
its primary commodities (i.e. manufactured goods, oil-based
products, silver, coffee and cotton). With an economy so reliant
on sales to external markets, the stability associated with dol-
larization seems fundamental to continued success, particularly
in terms of trade with the United States.8 Avoidance of an eco-
nomic crisis every six years is the seventh positive effect gained
from adopting the dollar. Historically in Mexico, a country in
which a presidential term lasts six years, an economic disaster
occurs at the conclusion of each presidential administration, as
was the case in 1976, 1982, 1988 and 1994. This "sexenio" is a di-
rect result of the short-term mentality employed by former Mexi-
can presidents who, although aware of the grave economic prob-
lems facing the nation and the need for immediate action, opted
to simply maintain the status quo as part of their "not-on-my-
watch" attitude. As one expert explains, the proximity of presi-
dential elections prompted the incumbent administration to
postpone implementing necessary policies. Consequently, shortly
after the new president was elected, the Mexican government's
only option was to devalue the peso and adopt harsh economic-
stabilization measures. s2 Eighth, dollarization comports with the
economic and judicial modernization plan that the Mexican gov-
ernment has been diligently implementing in recent years. Dol-
larization, in particular, would supplement new legislation in the
areas of international insolvency and secured transactions, all of
which share a common goal of, among other things, facilitating
foreign investment and rapidly improving the Mexican econ-
omy.83 The ninth reason why dollarization is advantageous for
81. See WORLD FACTBOOK supra note 41. In order of importance, Mexico's principal
export partners and the respective percentage of goods purchased are USA (89.3%), Can-
ada (1.7%), Spain (.06%), Japan (.05%), Venezuela (.03%), Chile (.03%) and Brazil (.03%).
See id.
82. Auberbach & Flores-Quiroga, supra note 24, at 4. See also Hearing/Salinas Testi-
mony, supra note 60. As a result of these repeated sexenios, a "monetary cynicism" has
traditionally pervaded Mexican society. True to this pattern, notwithstanding the solid
economic policies in place prior to the presidential elections in 2000, widespread fear of
another currency collapse and pervasive distrust of the monetary policy were endemic. In
light of this recurrent pessimism, which is undoubtedly prejudicial to the economy,
Salinas argues that "dollarization emerges as a radical but powerful option to rule out
currency risk and all the malaise that monetary instability causes in the real economy."
Id.
83. See Andrea Migdal et al., Mexico: An Overview of Secured and Unsecured Transac-
tions in Mexico, LAT. AM. L. & BUS. REP., Dec.31, 1997. See also Timothy Canova, Bank-
ing and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal Contagion, 7 U.S.-MEX. L.J.
85, 107 (1999).
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Mexico is that such a change recognizes the free-will of the pub-
lic, allowing the people to utilize their currency of choice. Similar
to many other Latin American nations, Mexico is already unoffi-
cially dollarized to a significant degree and a large percentage of
transactions, both large and small, are conducted in dollars even
without formal government recognition of this foreign currency.
While some jingoistic opponents of dollarization claim that intro-
ducing a foreign currency would constitute "an affront to the
Mexican people," recent public surveys controvert this theory by
demonstrating that the majority of Latin American citizens sim-
ply desire a strong medium of exchange. 4 The penultimate bene-
fit of dollarizing is reducing capital flight and increasing long-
term investment in Mexico. A pervasive problem throughout
Latin America is the "hot money" invested in certain countries at
opportune moments, which is hastily withdrawn at the first sign
of trouble. In other words, "[w]hen the investors suspect that the
relationship between the rates of devaluation and domestic in-
terest rates will reverse itself, they convert their local currency
into dollars and leave the place."5' This situation, argue experts,
is attributable solely to the existence of a local currency such as
the peso, which allows speculators to make sizable profits from
the constantly-fluctuating interest rates. Thus, if the fear of an
economic collapse were eliminated by the introduction of the
dollar, then the investors of hot money would tend to engage in
long-term endeavors." Finally, dollarization would allow the
84. See David Beim & Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The United States of Latin America?,
LATIN RISK, July 1999. This article explains that both common citizens and business
leaders in Latin America are increasingly asking for a stronger currency such as the dol-
lar. Id. Latin Americans are deeply distrustful of government power in terms of mone-
tary policy, argue the authors, "because they have seen such powers abused much more
often than they have seen them exercised benignly." Id. See also One World, One Cur-
rency: Destination or Delusion?, IMF ECONOMIC FORUM (International Monetary Fund,
New York, N.Y.), Nov. 8, 2000. Although this article acknowledges that dollarization
would be a possibility for Mexico, it claims that this maneuver would be insulting to the
people since "they would feel that they had lost something that was quite important to
them, even though they haven't managed to keep their own peso stable since they left the
system of fixed exchange rates." Id.
85. See Hearing/Hinds Testimony, supra note 42.
86. Id. This author claims that all the economic problems are interrelated in the sense
that high interest rates and short-term loans kill investment, which impedes the creation
of jobs, which causes social problems and political instability, which generates increased
appeal of populist politicians and policies, which lead to devaluations, enormous capital
flights and financial crises. Id. On the basis of this argument, the author concludes that




Mexican government to depend on the "external constraint" ar-
gument to implement necessary economic policies that would
otherwise be unacceptable to the general population. Although
local officials may concur wholeheartedly that Mexico needs to
institute profound changes in diverse areas, they are unwilling to
express such sentiments because doing so would be tantamount
to political suicide. While the Monetary Act does not contain any
explicit preconditions to dollarization, logic dictates that the
United States will be reticent to allow Mexico to officially adopt
the dollar unless this nation welcomes changes, too. 7 Accord-
ingly, by using the but-they-made-me-do-it argument reminisci-
ent of playground escapades, Mexican officials can successfully
implement rigid policies that would be untenable under other cir-
cumstances.'s
C. Potential Disadvantages for United States Due to the
Monetary Act
Due to the expanded use of the dollar abroad, passage of the
Monetary Act will undoubtedly have repercusions for the United
States, positive and negative alike. Accordingly, some experts
have described dollarization as a "mixed blessing" for all parties
involved. 9 As demonstrated below, though, the arguments of po-
tential threats to the United States generated from the increased
circulation of the dollar have little merit.
1. The U.S. Federal Reserve Must Safeguard The Mexican
Economy
In basic terms, the U.S. Federal Reserve (the "Fed") is the
87. Monetary Act § 3 (1999).
88. Philip Suttle, The Broad Issues on Monetary Union from a US Perspective, LOOKING
AHEAD, Sept. 1999, at 10. According to the author, some argue that governments in Latin
America are incapable of introducing tough policies without an external constraint. Id.
Therefore, "the United States would serve as the external constraint that would allow
Latin American policyrnakers to implement tough fiscal reforms." Id.
89. Dale McFeatters, The Almighty US-Ecuadorian Dollar, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS
SERVICES, Jan. 19, 2000. See also Aravind Adiga, Dollar Diplomacy, MONEY, April 2001
at 26. To justify characterizing the dollarization as a "mixed blessing" not only for the
United States, this author points out that while El Salvador gained a trustworthy cur-
rency, schools were required to impart special classes on U.S. history "so kids would know
about the gringos on the new money." Id.
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central bank of the United States, which is composed of (i) a cen-
tralized government agency known as the Board of Governors,
(ii) 12 regional banks located in major U.S. cities, and (iii) a
monetary policy decision-making unit called the Federal Open
Market Committee. In terms of functions, the Fed prints the
currency, acts as banker for the government and commercial
banks, and serves as lender-of-last-resort. Moreover, it sets
monetary policy principally by using open-market operations (i.e.
the buying and/or selling of securities) to alter bank reserves and
influence interest rates, and changing reserve requirements.
With these tools, the Fed affects interest rates, foreign exchange
rates, commodity prices, and inflation rates to achieve its princi-
pal goal of maintaining price and financial stability.90
It is argued that officially condoning Mexico's use of the dol-
lar will make it more difficult for the Fed to conduct monetary
policy favorable to U.S. national interests. These analysts claim,
in particular, that with dollarization the Fed "becomes responsi-
ble not only for the U.S. economy but the economies and mone-
tary policies of dollarized nations, with all the political risks that
entails."91 Other commentators agree with this notion, empha-
sizing that dollarizing a foreign system would inevitably necessi-
tate increased involvement by the Fed because the closer the cur-
rency exchange rate, the greater the impact on U.S. interest-rate
policy.9" Based on this allegedly unavoidable nexus between the
Fed and a dollarizing nation, this author argues that "even if the
United States does not lead the charge toward [dollarization or a
monetary union], it must be watchful if the momentum in other
countries continues."
93
This assertion has been rejected by other experts who, in
contrast, maintain that the mandate of the Fed always has been
and will continue to be domestic, irrespective of dollarization in
other nations.94 For instance, observers suggest that official dol-
90. JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 103d CONG., REPORT ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Comm. Print 1997).
91. McFeatters, supra note 89.
92. Suttle, supra note 88 at 10.
93. Id.
94. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Responding to Global Crises: Dollarization in
Latin America, ECONSOUTH, Second Quarter 1999. While discussing the role of the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC), the policy-making section of the Federal Reserve,
Jack Guynn, president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, explained that
"[t]he mandate of the FOMC is chiefly domestic. We're charged with delivering the best
economic conditions we can as defined by, among other things, the inflation rate, the GDP
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larization in Latin America is more accurately described as an
"evolutionary" instead of a "revolutionary" one since many coun-
tries in the region are already marked by high indices of unoffi-
cial dollarization, a situation that has had a negligible effect on
the Fed to date. Illustrating just how little influence this exter-
nal use of the dollar has on U.S. decision-makers, such experts
claim that the United States "has barely noticed the gradual
adoption of the dollars as a means of payment in many Latin
American economies, and official dollarization... would not
change matters much."5 It is argued, furthermore, that the Fed
is well accustomed to fending off pressure from extraneous
sources while setting a monetary policy designed to benefit not
only the United States, but also other nations to which it is
closely linked. These advocates of dollarization suggest, par-
ticularly, that Latin American economies are already acutely
aware of U.S. monetary policy actions and the Fed, for its part, is
sufficiently internationalist "because it understands the dangers
of a financial crisis abroad for the U.S. economy - that it already
comes under pressure to avoid monetary policies that would do
great damage to the rest of the world, including Latin America."'
In order to clarify the intentions of the United States in spite
of dollarization, some suggest that an explicit disclaimer could
prevent subsequent recriminations from abroad. Accordingly,
Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Fed, recently warned candi-
dates for dollarization that they do so at their own risk: "We
would never put ourselves in a position where we envisioned ac-
tions that we would take would be of assistance to the rest of the
growth, the unemployment rate and the safety and soundness of the banking system in
the United States." Id. Mr. Guynn did acknowledge, though, that even such domestic-
based decisions inevitably produce ramifications on a global level. "But, the policy envi-
ronment in which we attempt to achieve this mandate is global. No economic condition in
any part of the world can be considered exogenous. And any action intended to produce a
strictly domestic result is almost instantly transmitted around the globe and may or may
not be countervailed by a concomitant charge in international economic conditions." Id.
See also Steven K Beckner, Greenspan: Dollarization Unlikely to Create Problems for Fed,
MARKET NEWS INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 22, 2000. Greenspan clarified that the Fed would
not alter its policy to benefit dollarized countries. See id. Although US monetary policy
has historically taken into account the situation in the rest of the world, explained
Greenspan, the Fed "would not focus on the well-being of the world as a whole versus the
well-being of the United States." Id. Greenspan announced, moreover, that external
pressures subsequent to dollarization would have minimal impact on US policy, thereby
making the issue essentially moot: "As a practical matter, I really don't think that is a big
issue." Id.
95. Hearing/Gavin Statement, supra note 3.
96. Id.
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world but to the detriment of the United States."" This state-
ment was accurately interpreted by the Latin American countries
to mean that (i) the U.S. government is unwilling to extend the
safety net of the Fed system to dollarized countries that incur
economic trouble and (ii) the Fed will not determine monetary
policy to account for the cyclical differences between the United
States and Latin America.98 Likewise, the Monetary Act itself
expressly negates any accountability of the Fed in the event that
a country decides to dollarize. It establishes, specifically, that
the Fed "has no obligation to consider the economic conditions of
dollarized countries when formulating or implementing monetary
policy."99
2. The Monetary Act May Tarnish The U.S. Image Abroad
The second main reason for labeling dollarization a "mixed
blessing" for the United States is that, despite the express dis-
claimers of liability issued by the Fed and the Monetary Act, the
process may still tarnish the U.S. image abroad. Specifically, ex-
perts speculate that while dollarization would certainly
strengthen economic and other ties, the risk exists that in diffi-
cult times, the loss of monetary sovereignty will fuel resentment
and encourage policymakers to attribute problems to the United
States.' 0 In view of the region's history of political and economic
instability, the Clinton administration acknowledged its concern
that the relationship would become too close. According to U.S.
Treasury officials, "given the political dynamics that play out in
those societies at times of economic frustration, resentment could
be vented at us.,,1
Notwithstanding these arguments, high-ranking U.S. offi-
cials contend that the dollarization of Mexico and other Latin
American nations will have a significant effect neither on the
U.S. economy nor its reputation abroad.0 2 Experts argue, for in-
97. Larry Rohter, Using the Dollar to Hold the Line: US Currency Becomes Ecuador's,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 2000, at C1.
98. Id.
99. Monetary Act § 2(b)(2) (1999).
100. Official Dollarization in Emerging-Market Countries: Hearing Before Subcomm. on
Int'l Trade and Fin. and Subcomm. on Econ. Policy ofS. Comm. on Banking Housing, and
Urb. Affs., 105"' Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Hearing/Emerging Market Countries].
101. Rohter, supra note 97, at C1.
102. Beckner, supra note 94. According to Greenspan, there is already a significant
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stance, that even if dollarization forces the United States to ad-
just its political and monetary policy based on conditions reigning
in other countries, such a practice would by no means constitute
a novelty."' Additionally, the Monetary Act itself explicitly dis-
claims any relationship between permission to dollarize and U.S.
approval of policies, monetary or otherwise, in other countries.
As experts explain, certification of a nation does not equate to an
endorsement of the policies of the dollarized country. The Mone-
tary Act, moreover, is not designed to convert the U.S. Treasury
into an IMF-like entity that imposes draconian preconditions to
dollarization. Rather, certification merely represents "a judg-
ment by the Secretary of the Treasury that sharing seigniorage
with a country is in the [best] interest of the United States."1 4
3. The United States Will Forfeit Seigniorage Revenue
As explained previously, dollarization in accordance with the
Monetary Act entails sharing the seigniorage revenue between
the United States and the dollarizing nations. This profit shar-
ing, suggest the critics, deprives the United States of precious in-
come, especially in the case of country like Mexico with a popula-
tion of approximately 100 million and a relatively strong
economy. While it is irrefutable that the United States would
stand to lose proceeds if a country would have dollarized even
without the Monetary Act, this general criticism is unwarranted.
The express purpose of the Monetary Act is to induce those na-
tions that are leery of dollarizing because of a myriad of reasons,
both obvious and cryptic, to do so during times of relative pros-
perity and economic stability. In such cases, but for the entice-
ment supplied by the Monetary Act and the resulting dollariza-
amount of U.S. currency circulating outside of the United States, which has yet to cause a
problem. See id. In fact, explains the leader of the Fed, "[w]e've been able to adjust our
monetary policy to recognize that, and there have been no particular problems that have
occurred as a consequence of that." Id. Accordingly, reasons Greenspan, "there should be
no particular problems if additional countries were to dollarize as far as our mechanical
abilities to implement the appropriate monetary policy in the United States is concerned."
Id.
103. Hausmann et al., Financial Turmoil, supra note 47. According to the author, the
Fed will want to maintain total independence due to its fear that markets will presume
that it will consider the economic conditions of Latin America when setting policy. Id.
This fear, suggests the author, is a reality in today's world. "Was it not the economic con-
ditions of emerging markets and their impact on the US financial system that prompted
the interest rate cuts of October and November 1998?" Id.
104. Schuler & Stein, supra note 26.
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tion, no revenues whatsoever would have been generated. Thus,
borrowing from an adage understood by even the most inexperi-
enced industrialist, surely a portion of something is better than
all of nothing. Accordingly, instead of viewing the money appor-
tioned with dollarizing countries such as Mexico as a loss, the
overall economic benefit to the United States is more accurately
classified as a gain. This theory is supported by recent legisla-
tive studies indicating that, from a purely economic standpoint,
dollarization would undoubtedly be profitable for the United
States. According to a report by the Congressional Budget Office,
the U.S. revenues from seigniorage should increase by approxi-
mately $1 billion over the 2001-2010 period (during which no
payments are made to the dollarizing nations), while this nation
will only be required to pay some $980 million thereafter.
Moreover, the Monetary Act "would not affect the budgets of
state, local or tribal governments."'0 ° In any event, since the pros
and cons regarding the allotment of seigniorage earnings seems
to reach an equilibrium for the United States and the dollarizing
nation alike, perhaps this issue should not even be a deciding
factor."'
4. Obligatory Bank Supervision By The United States
Opponents of dollarization claim that the elimination of the
central bank and related regulatory agencies as a byproduct of
dollarization will obligate the United States to assume, in es-
sence, the role of bank supervisor in the dollarized nations. As
one of the weaker arguments against dollarization, such conten-
tion can easily be discarded. In legal terms, the Monetary Act
explicitly repudiates this claim by establishing that "the supervi-
105. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 105'
M 
CONG., REPORT ON COST OF LEGISLATION
(2000). This report acknowledges that such figures are, by obligation, speculative. Id. It
states that the budgetary effect of the Monetary Act cannot be estimated "with a great
degree of confidence" because i) existing estimates of dollar use in other countries are in-
consistent, (ii) determining the demand for dollars in a particular country were it to dol-
larize is troublesome, and (iii) assessing the probability that nations will dollarize with or
without the enactment of the Monetary Act is "necessarily subjective." Id.
106. See Hearing/Truman Statement, supra note 2. The author argues that sharing
seigniorage "would not cost the US taxpayer anything. However, if a country would have
dollarized anyway ... then sharing seigniorage by the US would imply forgoing additional
seigniorage revenues. At the same time, if the benefits of dollarization to a country are
significant, they should outweigh the lost seigniorage. In other words, the deciding factor
for either country should not be whether seigniorage would be shared." Id.
405
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sion of financial institutions in dollarized countries remains the
responsibility of those countries."' 7 This fallacious premise is
further discredited by years of practical experience in countries
such as Panama where dollarization has endured for decades
without placing the onerous of bank supervision on the United
States. In the words of one expert, "there is no logical connection
between dollarization and financial-market regulation. Panama
has successfully operated a fully dollarized economy for several
decades, and the U.S. has never involved itself in the supervision
and regulation of that country's banks." 8 Logic and functional
restraints, moreover, disprove the assertion that dollarization
would inevitably lead to intervention by the United States in lo-
cal bank administration. Citing the overall impracticality of U.S.
regulators overseeing banks in other countries, observers have
fervently rejected the possibility of such a role for the United
States: "Banking supervision has an element of politics: its effec-
tiveness depends on the ability of the monetary authority, the
executive branch and the courts to enforce compliance - indeed,
they might be considered interlopers who had no business med-
dling with local banks.' 0 9
5. The Fed Must Serve As Lender-of-Last-Resort
As discussed above, the central banks throughout Latin
America endeavor to meet the liquidity needs of local financial
institutions by granting loans generated, as rudimentary as it
may appear, from simply printing additional currency. In doing
so, these central banks are acting as lenders-of-last-resort be-
cause, in light of the dire economic circumstances typically facing
the applicant bank and the local economy as a whole, alternative
potential lenders are scarce if not altogether nonexistent. Adver-
saries of dollarization warn that once the central bank vanishes
upon the official adoption of the dollar, the Fed will be compelled
to adopt this role.
Similar to those directly preceding it, this contention has
also been rebuffed by dollarization advocates based on two main
counterarguments. First, experts explain that alternatives to
using a central bank as the sole lender-of-last-resort abound, rec-
107. Monetary Act § 2(b)(3) (1999).
108. Hearing/Gavin Statement, supra note 3.
109. See Schuler & Stein, supra note 26.
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ommending that the dollarized governments (i) secure lines of
credit from financial institutions abroad, (ii) set aside a liquid
fund to be loaned to local banks during an emergency, (iii) estab-
lish open contingency credit lines with multilateral public insti-
tutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank,
Inter-American Development Bank, etc., (iv) encourage foreign
ownership of domestic banks or (v) procure adequate insurance
in the private sector.1 ' Second, mindful of the potential compli-
cations caused by abolishing the central bank, the Monetary Act
provides anticipatory exoneration in this sense for the United
States, stipulating that "the Federal Reserve System has no obli-
gation to act as lender of last resort to the financial systems of
dollarized countries."11
C. Advantages for the United States due to Monetary
Act
Due to Mexico's important position in Latin America, politi-
cians and analysts worldwide are closely scrutinizing this na-
tion's dollarization debate. In terms of the U.S. perspective,
sources claim that this nation and its trading partners from Can-
ada to Chile will be watching all such dollarization efforts in-
tently, and "with a healthy dose of skepticism."". Notwith-
standing this overt curiosity, U.S. participation in this realm to
date has been labeled "agnostic," an ambivalence caused in part
by concerns about the mechanics of the process and the potential
added burden."' While such apprehension and inaction by the
United States were arguably justifiable when less-than-ideal
countries initiated dollarization under questionable conditions, in
light of the pivotal role that Mexico plays throughout the entire
western hemisphere, this strategy now appears inappropriate.
As explained in detail later in this article, a better approach
would entail enactment of the Monetary Act, thereby facilitating
110. Velasco, supra note 43, at 6; see also Hearing/Hinds Testimony, supra note 42; see
also Hausmann et al., Financial Turmoil, supra note 47; see also Official Dollarization in
Emerging-Market Countries: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Econ. Policy and
the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Fin. of the Senate Banking Comm., 105V Cong. (1999)
(testimony of David Malpass, Director for International Economics of Bear, Stearns and
Co., Inc.) [hereinafter Hearing/Malpass Statement].
111. Monetary Act § 2(b)(1) (1999).
112. Rohter, supra note 97, at C1.
113. Id.
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dollarization in Mexico and, in turn, benefitting the United
States both directly and indirectly.
Passage of the Monetary Act, however, has proven to be
quite difficult, principally because neither the general population
nor the politicians seem to grasp the magnitude of the benefits
that such a law is designed to generate. This widespread oblivi-
ousness to the potential advantages for the United States is
epitomized in the following statement commonly heard on Capi-
tol Hill: "[E]conomic policy is never a matter of altruism, and it's
only fair to ask: Why should the United States seek to share its
currency with the rest of the world?""4 Cognizant of the fact that
these tremendous benefits are not readily ascertainable, in the
following section this article sets forth the reasons for which pas-
sage of the Monetary Act, and the resulting dollarization of Mex-
ico, is advantageous for the United States.
1. The Monetary Act Concords with the Concept of Free
Trade
The proliferation of dollarization triggered by the Monetary
Act concords with the U.S. policy of hemispheric integration so
adamantly promoted by this nation during the last decade. Pur-
suant to the original timetable, by 2005 the Free Trade Area of
the Americas ("FTAA") should stretch from Alaska to the Tierra
del Fuego, thereby facilitating free trade between thirty four
countries located in the Western Hemisphere comprised of over
755 million people.1 ' Although enthusiasm for this mammoth
trade proposal seemed to wane during the late 1990s, the "Plan
114. Dollarization Bill Would Export Price Stability, THE HILL, Apr. 12, 2000, at 36.
Recognizing that egocentric analysis is understandable, Senator Connie Mack, the spon-
sor of the Monetary Act, explains that this law would occasion several benefits, including
(i) increasing trade with and raising living standards in Latin America, (ii) enhancing in-
vestment and thereby promoting economic growth, (iii) introducing currency stability in
the dollarized country, (iv) creating new markets for US goods in the 500-million person
Latin American market, and (v) reducing currency risk for North Americans investing in
Latin America. Id.
115. Dana Mibank, & Paul Blustein, Bush to Talk Trade at Summit, WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 2001, at Al. To gather support for his trade agenda, President Bush attended the
third Summit of the Americas in Quebec accompanied by a sizable congressional delega-
tion professing "that the US economy would reap substantial benefits from an FTAA,
which would significantly lower tariff and other barriers to trade and investment from the
Canadian Arctic to Tierra del Fuego." Id.; see also Ron Fournier, Leaders Talk Trade at
Quebec Summit, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2001.
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of Action" adopted at a recent summit clearly demonstrates a re-
newed interest in this project. As evidence of this revitalized
zeal, upon pledging to complete negotiations and implement this
new free-trade zone within five years, President Bush announced
that liberal trade throughout the hemisphere "starts with the co-
operation between Mexico, Canada and the United States. '... In
addition to the FTAA, the United States has spearheaded or
openly condoned numerous multilateral trade initiatives, such as
the North American Free Trade Agreement.'7 On the basis of
this integration theory, there are compelling reasons to enact the
Monetary Act.
According to one economist, for instance, the dollarization
promoted by this legislation would likely "encourage extensions
of the North American Free Trade Agreement throughout the
Americas: NAFTA could become AFTA.""1 ' Other experts concur,
emphasizing that the Monetary Act reveals the fact that dollari-
zation is directly related to the best interests of the United
States. In their view, NAFTA has opened the American hemi-
sphere to increased trade and investment from the United
States, and dollarization will enhance the structural links be-
tween the economies on both continents." Likewise, other finan-
cial authorities able to more readily identify the direct relation-
ship between dollarization and U.S. policy explain that
116. Anthony DePalma, Talks Tie Trade in the Americas to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2001; see also Leaders Sign Agreement for Trade Pact by December 2005, ASS'D
PRESS, Apr. 22, 2001. Impervious to those groups that attempt to impede free trade, at
the recent FTAA summit in Quebec President Bush unequivocally declared that he is
"going to pursue a free trade agenda." A.P. Wire, Declaration of Quebec City, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2001.
117. The amount of information on United States trade policy and NAFTA is abundant.
See, e.g., DePalma, supra note 116. Proud of the figurative road forged by NAFTA in
terms of trade, President Bush and others have recently referred to the FTAA proposal as
simply an extension of NAFTA. See id. Also admiring the progress of NAFTA during the
last few years is Mexican President Vicente Fox, who declared that "[wihen we started
negotiating NAFTA... in closed meetings and behind doors.. you had a sense that people
were ashamed of what they had done. But today we are proud ofNAFTA." Id.
118 Robert Barro, From Seattle to Santiago, Let the Dollar Reign, HOOVER DIGEST,
1999 No. 3. Advocating U.S. leadership in facilitating dollarization throughout the hemi-
sphere, this author contends that the current situation is be viewed as an 'opportunity'
instead of a risk. Id. "[Tlhe situation is actually an opportunity for the U.S. to promote a
dollar zone throughout the Americas by using Argentina as its fist client [and] the bene-
fits would be even greater if the system were extended from Argentina to less-reliable
countries such as Brazil and Mexico," argues Barro. Id.
119. Carlos S. Menem, Seminar on Dollarization, Paper presented at seminar entitled
Dollarization: A Common Currency for the Americas? (Mar. 6-7, 2000) in Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, [need publication date].
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propagation of the dollar deepens hemispheric integration, which
is "an avowed goal of U.S. policy and one that offers much poten-
tial for the U.S. economy."l"' If integration throughout the region
is truly a goal as opposed to mere political rhetoric, statesmen
with a more extreme perspective have suggested that dollariza-
tion itself is the most expeditious manner of achieving it. Ac-
cording to the former president of Argentina, for instance, "sim-
ply switching to a common currency would promote hemispheric
integration as effectively as would many thousands of man-hours
devoted to the ongoing negotiations over a free trade agreement
for the Americas."1 '
In light of the current conditions, it is argued that the
United States is effectively obligated to take a stance in order to
preserve its position as a global forerunner in terms of free trade.
One expert suggests, in particular, that a "neutral position [to-
ward dollarization abroad] has strong negative implications for
the U.S. with regard to global economic leadership."1 2  This ex-
pert maintains that, parting from the premise that a stable
monetary order is the foundation for a hemispheric free trade
agreement, the United States finds itself in a quandary: How to
propagate dollarization without creating the erroneous impres-
sion of imperialism.22 To demonstrate that U.S. interest in dol-
larization should be increased for reasons other than self-
interest, the author argues that chaos in an international mone-
tary system is the nemesis of a "global marketplace dedicated to
120. Hearing/Gavin Statement, supra note 3. The benefits for the United States iden-
tified by this author include increased economic stability "and more rapid development of
our neighbors in the hemisphere." Id.
121. Menem, supra note 119. This former Argentine official explains that the constant
fluctuations of national currencies impedes economic integration in the Americas. Id.
Switching to a common currency such as the dollar, therefore, would reduce the costs and
the risks of international trade, thereby promoting trade integration and economic devel-
opment in the region. Id.
122. Dolarizaci6n: Sending a Signal: Hearing on Official Dollarization in Emerging-
Market Countries Before the Subcomm. on Econ.Policy and the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade
and Fin. of the S. Banking, Housing and Urb. Affs. Comm., 105' Cong. (1999) (testimony
of Dr. Judy Shelton, Mbr. of the Bd. Empower America). According to Shelton, "[ilt would
be a mistake to the United States to be so cowed by the potential for diplomatic clashes
that it avoids encouraging movements toward dollarization in Mexico and Canada." Id.
At this juncture, contends Shelton, it is necessary to emphasize the positive implications
of stable monetary relations among vital trade partners. Id.
123. Id. The author presents the following issue: "FH]ow do we send a message of en-
couragement that neither seeks to entice nations toward dollarization with superficial
rewards nor obligates the United States to compromise its own perceived economic inter-
ests?" Id.
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free trade.""2 4 As drastic exchange-rate changes provoke accusa-
tions of dumping and unfair competition, governments tend to
utilize protectionist measures that prejudice international trade
and investment relations. Thus, although the United States has
not actively participated in any nation's decision to dollarize, un-
der the present circumstances, it is essentially obligated to react:
"Dollarization has arisen as a spontaneous movement within our
hemisphere - this puts the ball in our court. If the United States
neglects to play it, we lose the chance to win a decisive victory for
free trade and free markets."'
5
With regard to Mexico, policy analysts accurately note that
the United States' most pivotal relationship in Latin America is
with Mexico because, as they describe it, "[n]o other country in
the world affects the lives of Americans as much, and no country
is more intensely affected by U.S. policies."126 In recent years,
evidence of the flourishing relationship between these two coun-
tries is readily discernible. For example, Mexico has now sur-
passed Japan to become the United States' second-largest trad-
ing partner, eighty percent of Mexican exports are destined for
its northern neighbor, U.S. exports to Mexico have tripled over
the last ten years to reach some one hundred billion annually,
NAFTA has provided dispute-resolution mechanisms that have
facilitated numerous expeditious determinations, and Presidents
Bush and Fox have repeatedly announced their intentions of for-
tifying bilateral relations.'27 Based on this tight relationship and
some substantial problems in other countries in the region, policy
experts recommend that the Bush administration adopt all
measures (e.g. promoting dollarization) that would tend to rein-
vigorate hemispheric relations. They argue, in particular, that
"Bush should heed the warnings [because] if Latin American
loses confidence in Washington... the opportunities for American
leadership in the hemisphere will diminish, along with hopes for
an effective U.S.-Latin American partnership." Sympathetic
with this position, other experts suggest that the United States
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Peter Hakin, The Uneasy Americas, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2001, at 46, 57.
127. Id.; See also In Spanish, Bush Focuses on Working with Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, May
5, 2001. In his weekly radio address held coincidentally on the day of celebration of Cinco
de Mayo, President Bush announced that "Itihe history of Mexican-American relations
has had its troubled moments, but today our peoples enrich each other in trade and cul-
ture and family ties." Id.
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begin to encourage dollarization throughout the entire region,
using Mexico as a natural point of entry.
1 28
2. The Monetary Act's Effect On The Euro-Dollar Rivalry
Theorists claim that a decrease in the amount of usable cur-
rencies is a foregone conclusion, arguing that eventually all na-
tions will be driven to adopt one of only a few supranational cur-
rencies: the euro, dollar and yen.129 Due to this current global
trend of currency reduction, experts argue that dollarization is
necessary to confront the potency of the euro, the first "true rival"
of the dollar in decades. 13 0 This widespread phenomena of elimi-
nating weaker currencies has, according to analysts, created a
sense of urgency in Latin American countries to attempt to create
their own regional arrangements or, alternatively, to join the ex-
isting dollar or euro blocks. 3' Similarly, it is argued that in light
of the inevitability of a global currency competition the United
States is effectively obligated to take swift measures to facilitate
dollarization throughout the region.'32 To the contrary, after
fierce competition, these nations may adopt the euro. 3' In the
128. Judy Shelton, Dollarization as Destiny? (Feb.18, 1999), available at
http:/ www.IntellectualCapital.com., last visited Apr. 21, 2000. The author explains that
Mexico is the gateway to Latin America and will play a key role in establishing a common
monetary foundation to support expanded trade. Id. Accordingly, the author suggests
that the US send both an urgent message and a gracious invitation to Mexico: "We need
to talk." Id.
129. David J. Rothkopf, In Ecuador and Elsewhere, It's Change for a Dollar, WASH.
POST, Jan. 30, 2000, at B2. This author states that "Ecuador may have turned to dollari-
zation out of desperation. But when it did, it became part of an irreversible trend that is
a century in the making." Id.
130. BASICS OF DOLLARIZATION, supra note 8. The author explains that since the First
World War, the number of currencies with independent monetary policies has risen in
proportion to the number of independent countries. Id. However, the author states, a
period of currency consolidation has commenced that will again divide the world into two
or three large currency blocks. Id. The replacement of national currencies with the euro
in eleven Western European countries, argues Schuler, has created "the first true rival to
the dollar in half a century." Id.
131. Id.
132. Mark Falcoff, Dollarization for Argentina? For Latin America?, LATIN AMERICAN
OUTLOOK, Apr. 1999. The author explains that many economists believe that the world is
moving toward the use of two currencies: the euro and the dollar. Id. Thus, "[i]f the
United States refuses to assume the leadership to create a dollar area, some Latin Ameri-
can countries may feel obligated to adopt the euro." Id.
133. Alonso R. Trujillo, MERCOSUR: Trade Negotiations with EU, INTER-AMERICAN
TRADE REPORT, May 22, 2000. In April 2000, preliminary negotiations were held in Ar-
gentina between representatives of the European Union (EU) and MERCOSUR in order
to identify the structure and delegates for the forthcoming bilateral negotiations, which
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words of one expert, "the region, particularly the southernmost
portions, might become a battleground between the euro and the
dollar."1"4 In this perhaps unavoidable battle, Mexico could play a
pivotal role because increasing the circulation of the dollar, espe-
cially in a country comprised of some one hundred million people,
may lead to the adoption of the dollar by other Latin American
countries with larger economies that have manifested a sincere
interest in the possibility."5 In other words, "[d]ollarization by
one or more large Latin American countries [such as Mexico]
would significantly expand the number of people officially using
the dollar, moving the population of the dollar zone ahead of the
population of the euro zone for the time being."'36 It is suggested,
furthermore, that propagation of the dollar in Latin America
would allow the dollar to remain the "premier international cur-
rency," a position that the euro is now challenging.'37
3. Mexico Is a Test Case for the Monetary Act
Enactment of the Monetary Act and the ensuing dollariza-
tion of Mexico is important due to the symbolic importance of this
country. As a result of the precarious conditions during which
Ecuador decided to officially dollarize recently, this nation drew
considerable attention and was labeled, among other things, the
"economic guinea pig of Latin America."' While the situation in
are designed to facilitate the creation of a free trade area between these two blocks. Id.
Such heightened relations in terms of trade, investment and capital movements could
lead to the eventual adoption of the euro. Id.
134. Mark Falcoff, Dollarization for Argentina? For Latin America?, LATIN AMERICAN
OUTLOOK, Apr. 1999.
135. Bogetic, supra note 9; see also Ian Katz, Greenback Magic?, BUS. WK., March 13,
2000.
136. Schuler & Stein, supra note 26, at 7.
137. BAsics OF DOLLARIZATION, supra note 8; See also Dorte Verner, The Euro and
Latin America, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, June 1999, at 43. Notwithstanding the threat
to the dollar posed by the euro's introduction on Jan. 1, 1999, this article identifies several
positive effects that the unified European market and its single currency should have on
Latin America. Id.
138. Babette Stem, Working for the Yankee dollar, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY,
Oct. 18, 2000. This article states that "Ecuador's adoption of U.S. currency may hold
many lessons for the rest of Latin America" and "Ecuador is the biggest testing ground for
dollarization." Id.; see also Elliot Blair Smith, Ecuador's Dollar Success Shows Buck
Stops Nowhere, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2000, at lB. This author suggests that Ecuador's
dollarization has implications for other economies in the region. Id. In fact, explains
Smith, "[sleveral Latin American leaders say that if dollarization works in Ecuador -a
worst case scenario for a transition from a fast-devaluing currency to a fixed one- it can
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Ecuador was undeniably a test case for dollarization in general,
further analysis indicates that dollarization in Mexico would
more accurately be described as the true "guinea pig" for the
Monetary Act for several reasons.
First, in order to increase the probability of success after
dollarization, the Monetary Act encourages countries to officially
dollarize amid periods of economic and political stability, instead
of during a crisis. 3 ' Previously, in the absence of the Monetary
Act, nations such as Ecuador unilaterally decided to dollarize
their economies as an act of desperation during extremely
treacherous financial and political conditions. Supporters of this
monetary transition have claimed that dollarization has benefit-
ted Ecuador thus far, allegedly increasing foreign direct invest-
ment by thirteen percent and reducing inflation by ten percent
during the first quarter of 2000.40 The majority of the reports,
however, describe the transition as somewhat more turbulent,
citing problems with social unrest and public protests,' a lack of
necessary fiscal and banking reforms,"2 and the laundering of
work anywhere." Id.; see also Martin Barrow, End of Currency Not Worth a Dime, TIMES
(London), Sept. 8, 2000, at 31. This article state that policymakers in Argentina, Brazil
and Mexico are watching closely events in Ecuador, "aware they may soon be consulting
President Noboa's team on dollarization of their own economies." Id.; see also Wagering
on the Dollar, LATIN FINANCE, Sept. 1, 2000, at VII. This author describes dollarization in
Ecuador as a "test case ... which, if successful, could spread to other countries across the
Latin American continent." Id.; see also Larry Rohter, Using the Dollar to Hold the Line:
US Currency Becomes Ecuador's, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2000, at C1. According US Treas-
ury Department officials, describing Ecuador's decision to dollarize as untimely would be
a gross understatement: "Not only is the country's economy in terrible shape, but the de-
cision to dollarize was taken hastily and unilaterally, for reasons more political than eco-
nomic, catching Washington and international lending agencies completely by surprise."
Id. Accordingly, implementing dollarization in Ecuador, if successful, will serve as a
paradigm for other nations in the region. See also Jane Bussey, Ecuador's Dollarization
Seen As the Test Case for Controversial Measure, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 20, 2000. Accord-
ing to economists at the Inter-American Development Bank, the importance of dollariza-
tion in Ecuador cannot be underestimated: "If this fails, there aren't too many lessons be-
cause it is such a difficult case... But, if it succeeds, even in Ecuador, it can make it
anywhere." Id.
139. Schuler & Stein, supra note 26, at 7.
140. Samantha Newport, The Greenback Looks Like Good Medicine, BUS. WK., Oct. 9,
2000, at 25.
141. Ecuador Government, Indigenous Protestors Resume Dialogue, AGENCE FR.
PRESSE, Feb. 5, 2001; See also Ecuador Indian Protestors Refuse to Give Up Until De-
mands Are Met, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Feb. 2, 2001. The Confederation of Indigenous Na-
tionalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) has constantly protested the government's economic
policy and demanded that dollarization be reversed. Id.
142. Robert J. Barro, The Dollar Club: Why Countries Are So Keen To Join, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 11, 2000, at 25. The author indicates that dollarization of Ecuador is interesting be-
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drug money and counterfeiting.'43 Based on these and other
problems, observers conjecture that "[t]he hard part is still ahead
for Ecuador and its citizens" since it still has not identified a co-
herent program to attract foreign investment, privatized numer-
ous public institutions or implemented an accord signed recently
with the International Monetary Fund.' Unlike Ecuador, the
Mexican economy has enjoyed relative stability and growth in re-
cent years. Accordingly, the true feasibility of the Monetary Act
can be precisely assessed if Mexico were to dollarize under cur-
rent conditions.
Second, as the first Latin American country to adopt the
dollar under the auspices of the Monetary Act, other nations in
the region contemplating this maneuver may view Mexico as a
model. At one time or another, virtually all nations in the hemi-
sphere have openly debated the possibility of dollarizing, includ-
ing, among others, Brazil, "' Argentina, "6 El Salvador,'47 Costa
Rica, Guatemala,'48 Panama49  and Canada. While some of
cause few of the supposedly imperative preconditions- such as sound fiscal and banking
procedures- were fulfilled. Id. In fact, states the author, "these deficiencies were part of
the crisis atmosphere that generated the political consensus for dollarization." Id.
143. Larry Rohter, Ecuador's Use of Dollars Brings Dollars' Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2001, at A6. This author explains that Colombian drug-trafficking groups began to
purchase legitimate businesses in Ecuador as a way to launder their illicit earnings. Id.
He explains, moreover, that Ecuador's neighbor, Colombia, is not only one of the world's
principal sources of cocaine, but also the producer of approximately forty percent of the
counterfeit dollars in circulation worldwide. With the dollarization of Ecuador, "[ailmost
overnight its counterfeiters were presented with a new market of 12.5 million people right
on their doorstep land] not ones to miss an opportunity, they cranked up the presses." Id.
144. Thomas C. Trauger, Beating the Drum for the Dollar in Ecuador, Bus. WK., Jan.
22, 2001, at 6.
145. Domingo F. Cavallo, Brazil's Best Hope, FORBES GLOBAL, Feb. 22, 1999, available
at http://www.forbes.com/global1999/0222/02040la/html.
146. IADB's Calvo Says Argentina Dollarization 'Not a Bad Idea,' AFX EUROPEAN
Focus, Feb. 1, 2001. See also At the Mercy of the Dollar, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2001, at
A20.
147. Nfer Muoz, Economy-El Salvador: Gov't Upbeat After 30 Days of Dollarization,
INTE PRESS SERV., Feb. 2, 2001; see also Fitch: Fiscal Consolidation a Challenge for El
Salvador, BUS. WIRE, Jan. 19, 2001; see also Patrick Moser, Salvadoran Start Rebuilding
After Quake Devastation, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Jan. 18, 2001; see also Dollarization in El
Salvador, LATIN AMERICAN NEWSLETTERS, Jan. 9, 2001; See also Supreme Court To Con-
sider Complaint Against El Salvador's Dollarization, AP WORLDSTREAM, Jan. 6, 2001; See
also F.T. McCarthy, Divided About the Dollar: Dollarisation in Latin America: El Salva-
dor is Leading a Central American Charge to the Greenback, but other Latin Americans
Remain Cool, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 2001; see also Andrew Bounds, The Americas: El Salva-
dor Plans to Adopt US Dollar, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 24, 2000, at 14.
148. Dollarization Looks Good to Guatemala, EMERGING MARKETS WEEK, Apr. 3, 2000,
at 6. Some Central American countries have recently been increasingly interested in
dollarization: Guatemala and Nicaragua According to the general director of the Nicara-
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these countries have already opted to dollarize even without the
seigniorage-sharing benefits granted under the Monetary Act, a
successful economic transition in Mexico pursuant to this law
would logically spur other nations to do the same. This position
is supported by experts in Latin American financial issues who
explain that most nations in the Caribbean and Central America
are following Mexico's example of implementing rigid fiscal poli-
cies, privatizing domestic markets and instituting a liberal trade
regime. It would be logical, therefore, to fortify the situation by
dollarizing, which would ignite a chain reaction throughout the
region: "Argentina and Brazil, together with the rest of South
America, would follow suit later."'51  Likewise, dollarization by
Mexico under the Monetary Act could trigger a similar action in
Costa Rica, a nation reluctant to relinquish its national cur-
rency."' Foreign experts argue that Costa Rica is ill-prepared to
dollarize at this juncture because of (i) a scarcity of international
monetary reserves, (ii) a sizable foreign debt, and (iii) a trading
scheme wherein this nation's principal partners in Central
America are not dollarized."3 Costa Rican politicians, by con-
trast, cite the potential loss of seigniorage revenues as the pri-
mary justification for this country not to dollarize.'54 Thus, the
seigniorage-sharing aspect of the Monetary Act would eliminate
this argument, and Costa Rica would likely mimic Mexico by
guan Exportation Bank, Adolfo Arguello, "I wish dollarization would happen tomorrow."
Id.; See also Katz, supra note 135. According to the author, in the short term, "only small
and weak economies, such as Ecuador's, will switch to the dollar. Id. Calls for adopting
the greenback, however, could grow stronger in coming years as trade links between latin
countries and with the US multiply." Id.; See also Latin Nations Turn to US Dollars as a
Measure of Stability, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Jan. 6, 2001; See also Byron Dard6n, Dolari-
zaci6n: Procesos son distintos en Guatemala y El Salvador, PRENSA LIBRE, Feb.8, 2001; see
also Divisas - Reglamentos van a dolarizar, PRENSA LIBRE, March 20, 2001.
149 Juan Luis Moreno-Villalaz, Lesson From the Monetary Experience of Panama: A
Dollar Economy with Financial Integration, CATO JOURNAL, Winter 1999.
150 Eric Beauchesne, Canada Urged to Abandon Dollarization, CALGARY HERALD, Oct.
5, 2000, at D4. See also World in Brief, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2000, at A18.
151 Front Notes, LATIN FINANCE, Oct. 2000, at 10.
152 Xinhau News Agency, Controversy Over Dollarization in Central America Contin-
ues, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 11, 2001.
153 Patricia Leit6n, Dolarizar? todavia no, LA NACION, Feb. 22, 1999 (including com-
ments by Guillermo Calvo, professor of economics at the University of Maryland).
154. Patricia Leitbn, Dificil cambiar moneda, LA NACION, Nov. 20, 1999. See also Mau-
ricio Herrera, Pais no debe dolarizar, LA NACION, Sept. 6, 2000. The President of the
Central Bank of Costa Rica, Eduardo Lizano, introduced the idea of dollarization in 1999.
Id. This idea, however, was later rejected by President Miguel Angel Rodriguez because
of the possible revenue sacrificed by Costa Rica if it were to cease printing colones, the
local currency. Id.
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adopting the dollar. Such prediction is consistent with public
announcements issued by, among others, diverse Costa Rican
chambers of commerce.155
4. Strengthen U.S. Investment in and Trade with Mexico
Many U.S. companies such as General Motors, Coca-Cola,
Kodak and Hewlett Packard have a major presence in Mexico.
According to experts, such a notable presence is an indication of
investor confidence in the country: "[M]ore and more multina-
tional companies come to the conclusion that this country is a
great place for business."' 6 This realization, though, is far from
novel. In fact, since the introduction of NAFTA in 1994, over $64
billion in direct foreign investment has entered Mexico and ex-
perts predict increased interaction in the near future in diverse
areas."' This interaction will be enhanced by, inter alia, a recent
agreement between the Export-Import Bank of the United States
and a Mexican development institution designed to increase
trade by small and mid-size businesses on both sides of the bor-
der."' In complying with its NAFTA commitments, Mexico has
opened new investment opportunities for U.S. entities dealing in
energy, railroads, financial services and telecommunications.
59
The passage of the Monetary Act and the ensuing dollarization of
Mexico would serve to safeguard U.S. investments in Mexico, di-
rect and indirect alike. Dollarization, for instance, would create
a stable environment in the international financial markets,
thereby eliminating the recent economic crisis in Mexico that dis-
suaded long-term investment by those in the United States. In
addition, the use of a common currency would reduce transaction
costs for U.S. resident importers, exporters, borrowers and lend-
155. Marvin Barquero, Cdmaras del Istmo apoyan dolarizaci6n, LA NACION, Feb. 2,
2001.
156. Jim Robinson, The Top 50 Foreign Companies in Mexico: As Mexico Embraces Free
Trade and Puts Fiscal House in Order, More Multinational Companies Pour Into the
Country, BUS. MEX., July 1, 2000.
157. Robinson, supra note 156. The author argues that "it will come as no surprise that
Mexico has overtaken Japan as the United States' second-largest trading partner. And,
in less than ten years, Mexico expects to beat out Canada for the coveted role as the
United States' number-one trading partner." Id.
158. Brendan M. Case, Ex.Im Bank Agrees to Boost Presence in Mexico, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, March 28, 2001, at 4D.
159. BUREAU OF INTER-AM. AFFS. OF THE U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, FACT SHEET: NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA), 1996.
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ers. This reduction in administrative costs would naturally re-
sult in an increase in the amount of U.S.-Mexican transactions
conducted. Moreover, given the fact that under the Monetary Act
Mexico would be required to open its banking system to foreign
competition, dollarization would increase the market for services
provided by U.S. banks and other financial institutions. 60 Yet
another benefit to U.S. investors is that the lowered inflation
rates afforded by dollarization would generate greater levels of
consumption of U.S. products in Mexico. According to experts,
"It]he stronger consumption and increased sales this growth
would spark could improve the performance of US businesses
that export to dollarized markets."'6' Finally, the Mexican mar-
kets for U.S. goods would become less volatile because, upon
dollarization, Mexico would be unable to make "competitive de-
valuations" designed to impede U.S. exports. This inability to
devaluate would, in addition, foster a more harmonious US-
Mexican trade relationship by reducing incidents of alleged
"dumping," which tend to arise when there are large unexpected
devaluations that suddenly make the goods considerably less ex-
pense. In short, dumping allegations are not derived from tech-
nological advantage; rather, they are a byproduct of "capricious
exchange rate policies." 62
5. Eventual Dollarization of Canada
One of the explicit goals of NAFTA is to "eliminate barriers
to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods
and services between the territories of the parties.""3 Without a
doubt, reaching this objective and thereby fortifying NAFTA
would be simplified if all member-countries shared the same cur-
rency. While Mexico has expressed its interests in adopting the
dollar, the predominate view in Canada has been outright rejec-
tion of such proposal despite the undeniably tight relationship
between the economies of these three nations. For example,
160. Hearing/Hinds Testimony, supra note 42.
161. Responding to Global Crises, supra note 12.
162. BASICS OF DOLLARIZATION, supra note S.
163. North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), Dec. 17, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 289
(1993), Article 102(a).
164. Canada: Dodging Downdrafts, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2001, at 35. Describing
the tightness of the relationship between the US economy and that of its northern neigh-
bor, this author explains that "[wihen the United States' economy sneezes, so does Can-
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some Canadian experts argue that dollarization is unnecessary
because economic problems in this country are not attributable to
monetary shocks because of poor policy decisions; rather, the
volatility is due to real forces hitting the economy. These forces,
it is argued, will not be eliminated by dollarization.t' Similarly,
other Canadian experts argue that dollarization is not feasible
since Canada and the United States do not constitute an "opti-
mum currency area," a prerequisite to dollarizing.' Rejecting
the contention that the Canadian economy is inferior to that of
the United States, still other experts from this country argue
that external assistance is unjustified. They state, in particular,
that "Canada does not need to use the U.S. dollars for purposes of
monetary and fiscal discipline; it has already demonstrated at
least as much discipline in these areas as has the United
States."67 Finally, other renowned Canadian economists do not
reject the idea of a common currency in theory. They argue,
ada's- but usually about six months later." Id. See also Donald Coxe, Why the Loonie Is
So Lousy, NATL POST, Apr. 7, 2001, at C2. Rejecting the possibility of dollarizing Canada,
this author labels the act "a shameful abrogation of sovereignty" and asks two rhetorical
questions, namely (i) "Does anybody think the Federal Reserve would take Quebec or
even Alberta into its policy discussions? and (ii) Does anybody rational really think
Americans want to assume responsibility for Canada?" Id. See also Alan Toulin, Dollar
Up Deviation Says Report: Won't Hit 60 Cents: Investor Confidence Unexplained Factor in
Loonie's Slide, NAT'L POST, Apr. 4, 2001, at C1. A memorandum prepared by the Deputy
Finance Minister of Canada, Kevin Lynch, clearly illustrates the position of the Canadian
government toward dollarization: "Dollarization is unacceptable to us. It would mean
zero influence over monetary policy, zero democratic accountability and zero capacity to
deal with crises." Id.
165 Jack L. Carr & John E. Floyd, Real and Monetary Shocks to the Canadian Dollar:
Do Canada and the US Form an Optimum Currency Area, WORKING PAPER No. UT-
ECIPA-FLOYD-99-01 (Inst. for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto), 1999. The authors
argue that the evidence clearly demonstrates that the movements in the real exchange
rate reflect, in large part, economic shocks. Id. "The real exchange rate is volatile be-
cause there is volatility in real economic conditions. The volatility is not due to unpre-
dictability in macroeconomic policy or speculative shocks to the demand for money, but
rather to volatility in real forces hitting the economy," they explain. Id.
166 Suttle, supra note 88. In order for countries to represent an "optimum currency
area" the following criteria must be met: (1) relatively mobile factors of production (e.g.,
capital and labor), (2) high degree of trade integration, (3) similar economic structures,
and (4) integrated fiscal union. Id.; see John W. Crow, Any Sense in a Canadian Dollar?,
POLICY OPTIONS, Mar. 1999, at 33. This author argues that at least one of these criteria
has not been fulfilled. Id. He postulates, in particular, that "NAFTA does not allow for,
or even contemplate for the future, the free movement of labor in search of new job oppor-
tunities... In fact, an important part of the U.S. rationale for negotiating NAFTA was
that trade-induced prosperity in Mexico would encourage Mexican labor to stay at home
rather than come across the border." Id.
167. John McCallum, The Case Against Monetary Union: A View From Canada,
LOOKING AHEAD, Sept. 1999, at 17.
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however, that a true monetary union similar to that of the Euro-
pean Union would be preferable to the adoption of the dollar and
all that using this U.S. currency entails. 
1 6
Notwithstanding these perhaps excessively nationalistic ar-
guments, other Canadian experts with a more realistic perspec-
tive have acknowledged that this country would be more recep-
tive to dollarization if Mexico were to adopt the U.S. currency in
accordance with the Monetary Act. In fact, such experts insinu-
ate that dollarization by its Latin American trade partner may
actually obligate Canada to do the same in order to maintain the
equilibrium within NAFTA: "If Mexico were to dollarize ... we'd
be offside in NAFTA on the currency issue [and] I'm not sure this
wouldn't trigger enormous soul-searching here."'69 Other Cana-
dian commentators with greater temerity in making predictions
about the secondary effects of Mexico's possible dollarization con-
clude that Canada's paranoia of being left behind and isolated
will force it to follow Mexico's lead. It is claimed, specifically,
that "[tihe interesting question is what Mexican dollarization
would mean for Canada... the increasing convergence of the
NAFTA countries could result in Mexico willingly entering a
monetary union with the United States and Canada being
dragged in somewhat against its better judgment."'70  Based on
these comments, it is arguable that passage of the Monetary Act
and the ensuing dollarization by Mexico would create inertia po-
tent enough to induce even Canada into switching its currency in
its quest to fortify NAFTA further.
6. Fortification of the Mexican Economy
Due to Mexico's proximity to the United States, the facets of
the relationship between these two nations abound. For exam-
ple, major issues dealt with on a regular basis include migration,
illicit drug activity, environment and natural resources, trade,
human rights, and political reform. Moreover, the economics of
these two countries are so inextricably linked that the relation-
168. Herbert G. Grubel, The Case for the Amero: The Economics and Politics of a North
American Monetary Union, The Fraser Institute (1999) (on file with the University of Mi-
ami Inter-American Law Review).
169. Eric Beauchesne, Lock Dollar to US Currency - Courchene Sees Pressure Mounting
on Government as Dollar Sinks, THE OTrTAWA CITIZEN, May 24, 2000, at Al.
170. Suttle, supra note 88, at 10.
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ship has been described as an "economic partnership for Ameri-
can prosperity."'' On the basis of this description, it is apparent
that the strength of the Mexican economy is of paramount impor-
tance to both the United States and Mexico, for stability in the
latter benefits the NAFTA region in its entirety. A significant
portion of the Mexican economy is derived from foreign invest-
ment, which will increase with dollarization.
Recent studies analyzing Mexico are positive, suggesting
that the economy is growing as a result of sound monetary policy
and political stability. 172 The economy should be strengthened
ever further if the plans of Vincente Fox, the new president-elect
of Mexico, are implemented. Fox is determined to fortify the
Mexican economy and the relations with the United States. Evi-
dence of such ambition are his visits with U.S. politicians even
before he officially assumed the presidency.1 73  According to ex-
perts, Fox is highly qualified to accomplish such goals since, un-
like previous Mexican presidents who have been everything from
"fervent nationalists to bean-counting economists," Fox is "a
businessman to the core."'74 From the outset of his presidential
campaign, Fox has repeatedly emphasized his goal of bolstering
the Mexican economy. In fact, the strength of the economy con-
stituted such a major plank of Fox's political platform that, in the
opinion of some observers, Fox actually won the presidential elec-
171. See generally BUREAU OF INTER-AM. AFFS. OF THE U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, WORKING
WITH MEXICO: BUILDING AMERICA'S FUTURE, June 10, 1998, at
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/whafs 980610_mexico-working.html (last visited Sept.
21, 2001) [hereinafter WORKING WITH MEXICO].
172. Deborah L. Riner, Solid Ground: With Elections Looming, AMCHAM's Chief
Economist Gives You the Low-Down on the Mexican Economy, BUS. MEX., June 1, 2000. A
report by the Mexican-American Chamber of Commerce indicates that the economy
should continue to grow: "There seems to be a broad consensus on the fundamentals of
sound economic policy. The political process, which could culminate in the PRI's losing
the presidency for the first time since the party's birth in the 1920's, has not derailed the
economy or sent the financial markets into turmoil. There's still a lot of ground to cover,
but markets and democracy are more strongly rooted in Mexico than ever before."Id.
173. Mimi Hall, Mexico's Fox Seeks More Open Borders: Next Mexican Leader Wins
praise, But No Promises, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 2000, at 1A. Fox met with both Bill
Clinton and Al Gore in Washington D.C. just one month after his election. Id. While
Clinton did not instantly embrace Fox's proposal to open US borders to a freer flow of la-
bor, products and services, he did recognize Fox as "a visionary determined to improve his
country's economy." Id.; See also Rebeca Rodriguez et al., Fox Meets With Bush: Presi-
dent-Elect of Mexico Lays Out His Vision, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Aug. 26, 2000, at
1. Not taking any chances, during his visit to the United States Fox met with both major
presidential candidates, Gore and Bush. Id.
174. Happy Birthday, Sefor Fox, THE ECONOMIST, July 8-14, 2000, at 31.
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tion by "promising to throw the Mexico's economic development
into overdrive." 7' For their part, it appears that investors
throughout the region have faith in Fox's economic plan."'
Fox has unequivocally announced his intention of increasing
foreign investment, which, in turn, strengthens the Mexican
economy. An enlargement of foreign investment, however, will
be infeasible without the existence of monetary stability in Mex-
ico. Thus, it is logical that Fox has a vested interest in ensuring
that such economic predictability is achieved by adopting the
dollar pursuant to the Monetary Act. As explained earlier, due to
their proximity, physical and otherwise, the United States and
Mexico are inextricably linked. The fortification of the Mexican
economy, therefore, will undoubtedly benefit all the countries
throughout the region, including the United States.
7.Support for Existing U.S. Foreign Policy
Enactment of the Monetary Act and the ensuing dollariza-
tion of Mexico are recommendable because such actions concord
directly with U.S. foreign policy. Far from gestures of altruism,
the aid given by the U.S. to Mexico is self-motivated due to the
tight interrelationship between the two neighboring countries
which, in the words of former president Harry S. Truman, have
the common purpose of living together in harmony and working
together for prosperity on both sides of the border. 7' For in-
stance, approximately 500,000 Americans reside in Mexico, 2600
U.S. companies operate there and sixty percent of foreign direct
investment in Mexico originates in the US. Mexico is also an im-
portant trading partner, obtaining nearly seventy five percent of
its imports from the U.S. Furthermore, Mexico's importance in
setting American policy has increased in the last few years as a
direct result of, among other things, the signing of NAFTA in the
175. Brenda Case & Alfredo Corchado, Fox Tells Texas Business Leaders He May Allow
Casinos in Mexico, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 26, 2000, at 1F.
176. Id. Fox "has excited the North American business community with talk of in-
creasing foreign investment in Mexico from already high levels of $11 billion a year." Id.
177. Madeleine K Albright, Remarks at Dep't. State Binational Commission Opening
Plenary (May 5, 1997), available at http://secretary.state.gov/ www/statements/
970505.html. Expanding on the theme introduced by Truman decades ago, the current
Secretary of State explained the depth of the relationship between these two nations:
"Our agenda is broad because US-Mexican relations are broad. Our border is long; our
people visit each other, study each other, work with each other, conduct business with
each other and influence each other every day." Id.
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1990s. 178 Based on these facts, the U.S. government has publicly
recognized that:
U.S. relations with Mexico are as important as those we have
with any other country in the world. A stable, democratic and
prosperous Mexico is fundamental to U.S. national security.
How the United States engages this neighbor and international
partner now will have a direct effect on the lives and livelihoods
of millions of Americans in the years to come."'
This idea that U.S. foreign policy involves, among other
things, an emphasis on Mexico due to the reciprocal benefits that
the U.S. may derive from such actions has been announced on
numerous occasions. According to representations of U.S. foreign
affairs officials, for example:
[T]o preserve our own freedom in the United
States and our own values; to keep the U.S. eco-
nomically strong and prosperous; to protect our
citizens from such transnational threats of terror-
ism, drug trafficking and environmental degrada-
tion, we must fully be engaged in promoting de-
mocracy and prosperity in this hemisphere, and we
must maintain a close cooperative relationship
with the region.' s°
This aspect of U.S. foreign policy should obtain heightened
importance as an increasing amount of U.S. investment and
products enter Mexico under NAFTA. In fact, according to the
U.S. Department of State, thanks to the stabilization of the
Mexican economy and the signing of NAFTA, new opportunities
for U.S. exporters and investors are being created, from which
178. Changing Hats Across the Rio Grande, THE ECONOMIST, July 8-14, 2000, at 30.
Due to the fact that there are approximately 20 million Mexicans in America, this country
is becoming "a touchstone of sorts for the United States." Id.
179. See WORKING WITH MEXICO, supra note 171.
180. Jeffrey Davidow, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean in
the Clinton Administration's Second Term, Address before the Council of the Americas,
Dept. of State, (Apr. 28, 1997), at http'//www.state.gov/www/ re-
gions/wha/970428_davidowcoa.html. See also Anne W. Patterson, Remarks by the Dep-
uty Asst. Sec., Bureau of Inter-Am. Affs., at the Council of the Americas Conf., D.C. (May
6, 1996), at http://www.dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ ERC/bureaus/lat/1996/960506 PattersonEcon-
omy.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2001). Solid economic prospects and the strengthening of
democracy "make Latin America and the Caribbean an excellent partner for the U.S. See
id. Our relations with Latin America are based on mutual benefits and mutual responsi-
bilities," remarked the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-Am. Affairs. Id.
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numerous mutual benefits will be acquired. 81
The Monetary Act may also provide the United States with a
more efficacious way to meet its foreign policy goals in light of
several failed models. During the last few decades, the United
States has conferred enormous sums of money designed to foster
with the development of emerging market countries such as
Mexico. Such economic assistance, argue policy analysts, has
been ineffectual overall. Therefore, they suggest that Monetary
Act will constitute a "win-win proposition." For its part, the
United States attains "a more prosperous trading partner and
the satisfaction of knowing that a policy actually is helping to
boost living standards." At the same time, the dollarizing na-
tions obtain a stronger currency, economic stability and in-
creased foreign investment. Based on these arguments, it is sug-
gested that the Monetary Act offers the United States an
effective choice in terms of foreign policy: "Continue with failed
foreign aid programs that are bad for both taxpayers and recipi-
ents, or shift to dollarization, a policy that replaces good inten-
tions with good results."
18 2
8. Ripeness of the Monetary Act
As mentioned in the introductory paragraphs of this article,
the official position of the U.S. government regarding the Mone-
tary Act has been that dollarization, under the appropriate con-
ditions, is recommendable for all parties involved. Illustrative of
such attitude are the documents drafted by high-ranking officials
at the U.S. Treasury Department stating that responsible dol-
larization constitutes a "sensible" yet "unilateral" decision for
181. See BUREAU OF INTER-AM. AFFS. OF THE U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COOPERATION WITH
MEXICO: IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST, May 1, 1996 at http://www.dosfan.lib.uic.
edu/ERCO/bureaus/lat/1995/95051OMexicoCooperation.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2001).
According to the State Department, as the Mexican economy recovers after the peso crisis
and the recession of 1995, "NAFTA will create important new opportunities for US ex-
porters and investors." .d. Furthermore, this ever-deepening relationship will affect
many areas including maintaining democracy, human rights, migration, illicit drugs, ex-
port/import, economic, and environment. Id.
182. See Daniel J. Mitchell, The U.S. Dollar: Real Help for the Developing World, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION - NEWS & VIEWS, Jan. 26, 2000, available at http://www.heritage.
org/viewsI2000/ed012600b.htm. Obviously embittered by the customary callousness of the
decision-making process in the capitol, this author states that the benefits of the Mone-
tary Act are so apparent that the decision to enact it "should be a clear choice, even in
Washington." Id. (emphasis added).
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other nations. The United States, therefore, "should remain open
to the possibility of sharing seigniorage revenues ... with coun-
tries that dollarize under the right circumstances.""'3 Notwith-
standing this apparent support for dollarization, to date politi-
cians have failed to enact the Monetary Act based primarily on
the argument that such legislation was not timely. For instance,
according to former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers,
due to the fact that the Monetary Act may raise a multiplicity of
complex political, foreign policy and economic issues, "the
[Clinton] Administration does not think the time is ripe for this
legislation and cannot support it at this time."184 While the
Monetary Act may have been slightly "green" when originally in-
troduced, due to a number of circumstances that have changed
since this time, this legislation is now so ripe that overlooking it
again on Capitol Hill will inevitably generate a spoilage prejudi-
cial to, in particular, the United States and Mexico.
When the Monetary Act was first introduced in 1999, the
dollarization debate in Mexico was at an incipient stage and the
probability of this nation adopting the U.S. currency seemed
negligible. In fact, at the annual meeting of the World Economic
Forum during this year, Mexican government officials flatly de-
nied any interest in dollarization, preferring instead to maintain
the floating exchange-rate policy that is currently utilized by
Mexico in an attempt to stabilize the economy.' This traditional
reticence toward adopting the dollar, however, has markedly
changed in recent years thanks to, among other things, a prolific
public debate on this issue involving diverse sectors of Mexican
society and the election in 2000 of President Fox, who managed
to displace the Partido Revolucionario Institucional ("Revolution-
ary Institutional Party") that had controlled the government for
over seventy years. Fox, a person educated at ivy-league univer-
sities in the United States and experienced as a bilingual profes-
sional working for U.S. multinationals located in Mexico, has also
managed to introduce an unparalleled level of liberalism and
modernity in terms of economic policy for his nation. Coupled
with other factors, these changed circumstances in Mexico have
revived the interest of this country in dollarizing to such levels
183. S. REP. No. 106-354 (2000) (letter from former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence
H. Summers to Senator Connie Mack dated July 13, 2000).
184. Id.
185. See generally Auberbach & Flores-Quiroga, supra note 24.
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that, according to experts, this issue "is likely to remain on the
Mexican agenda in the years to come."'86
For nearly three decades, Mexico has suffered variable infla-
tion rates, extremely high real and nominal interest rates, ex-
ternal and internal financial shocks, currency devaluations, rapid
growth of external debt, generalized economic slowdown, in-
creased poverty, and a very uneven distribution of income."'
Consequently, the "overriding goal" in Mexico is to avoid the pe-
riodic financial crises that have had a damaging effect on Mexi-
can economic performance and stability. While Mexico seems to
enjoy a consensus on the ultimate goal, controversy and discord
surround the attempts to identify the most appropriate method
to reach such objective."" One potential method, dollarization,
has spurred a highly polarized and contentious debate, with some
groups vehemently arguing that dollarization is the obvious rem-
edy, while others contend with equal zeal that relinquishing the
peso is not a feasible solution whatsoever.
With regard to support for dollarization in Mexico, the busi-
ness community in general has repeatedly announced its ap-
proval of such action for three main reasons, namely (i) fear of
yet another economic crisis at the end of each six-year presiden-
tial administration (i.e. the recurrent sexenio), (ii) the collapse of
Mexico's domestic credit market after the peso devaluation in
1994, which served to exclude small and medium-sized Mexican
firms from access to international capital markets, and (iii) the
growing integration of NAFTA that creates demand for an ar-
rangement (such as dollarization) that reduces transactions costs
in commercial exchanges between these two nations.'89 In addi-
tion to this generalized support from the private sector, encour-
agement for dollarization is given by a wide array of groups, in-
186. Id.
187. See Hearing/Salinas Testimony, supra note 60; See also Salinas-Le6n, supra note
80. "One d-word (devaluation) has been replaced by another d-word (dollarization)." Id.at
1. "Dollarization" originates from 'wholly understandable concerns on how to perma-
nently rule out exchange-rate risk, and thereby enhance the quality of a monetary system
decimated by twenty-five years of depreciation, debt and stagnation." Id.at 1.
188. See generally Augustin Del Rio Toffi, Dollarization in Mexico: A Road Toward Fi-
nancial Stability, LOOKING AHEAD, Sept. 1999. Proponents of dollarizing North America
have been "conspicuous in Mexico" in the last few years. See id. In spite of this recent
support for using the dollar to solve some of Mexico's historic problems, this author ex-
plains that "'tihere are different views of how best this could be accomplished and over
what timetable." Id.
189. Auberbach & Flores-Quiroga, supra note 24, at 13-15.
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cluding Mexican think tanks,9 ' economic experts, 9' various
Mexican chambers of commerce,1 92 academics,93 and assorted
Mexican government officials."' Dollarization is recommendable
at this moment even though the Mexican economy has been
somewhat reformed and is not currently experiencing any nota-
ble difficulties because, according to these groups, Mexico would
always benefit from deeper financial integration with its north-
ern neighbor. In fact, despite claims to the contrary, they argue
that dollarization should only be implemented in Mexico while
these positive circumstances prevail. It is claimed, in particular,
that introducing dollarization in desperate times "does a dis-
service to the institution" because many countries like Mexico
with economies that are doing alright "would benefit from the
immediate introduction of [dollarization] to deepen economic in-
tegration and hence build much better growth prospects."'95
From their perspective, the advantages of dollarizing Mexico
are so readily apparent that the adoption of such a measure re-
quires little thought. In other words, the concept of dollarization
is a "no-brainer."'96 While recognizing that the current method
used by Mexico to stabilize the economy (i.e. the floating ex-
190. Carmen Rangel, Es opci6n real dolarizacidn, EL IMPARCIAL, Nov. 29, 1999. A
study by the Centro de Investigacibn y Docencia Econ6mica reveals that Mexico is ready
to dollarize due to the fact that (i) it has plenty of international reserves, (ii) its economy
is not overly dependent on petroleum, and (iii) it has high levels of trade with the United
States. See id.
191. Rechaza Fox lineas de FMI y bancos, REFORMA, Sept. 25, 2000 (support from Rudi-
ger Dornbusch, a professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
192. Maria Zifiiga, Exigen empresarios dolarizar, EL NORTE, March 16, 1999 (support
offered by Confederaci6n de Cdmaras Industriales (CONCAMIN); See also Maria Zdihiga,
Propone IP a Zedillo dolarizar economia, EL NORTE, March 12, 1999; Ricardo Becerra, La
dolarizaci6n tomada en serio, EL ECONOMISTA, Mar. 17, 1999 (support offered by Consejo
Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios (CMHN)).
193. Judy Shelton, No lo llamen dolarizaci6n, EL ECONOMISTA, May 10, 1999. During a
conference entitled "El reto de la establidad: hacia una moneda sana en Mexico" held at
the Escuela Duxx de Liderazgo Empresarila in Montorrey, Judy Shelton, a professor at
this university, urged the attendees not to believe the rhetoric of those portraying them-
selves as patriotic and characterizing dollarization as an act of political submission. Id.
Rather, Ms. Shelton argued that dollarization should be called (i) the search for a stable
currency, (ii) the establishment of a solid monetary foundation to support an economy
that is to become stronger, and (iii) the new currency in Mexico for an economy dedicated
to education, innovation and enterprising spirit. Id.
194. Divided About the Dollar, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 2001. The article notes that
Francisco Gil Diaz, Finance Minister of Mexico, did not deny his support for dollarization.
However, Gil Diaz acknowledges that political will is lacking: "The yanqui dollar is still a
hard sell for Latin American politicians." Id.
195. Dornbusch, supra note 39.
196. Id.
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change rate) has rendered overall positive results in the short
term, other commentators warn that such a technique cannot be
used forever."7 Based on the temporary nature and limited scope
of the current Mexican tools, this nation must choose its battles
strategically. For instance, one author argues that since Mexico
is unable to concurrently achieve exchange-rate parity, open the
local economy to foreign investment and maintain an independ-
ent monetary policy, one of these objectives must be forsaken.
Due to the fact that the first two are imperative to avoid over-
whelming inflationary pressures, Mexico's only real option is to
surrender autonomy in terms of monetary policy by dollarizing
the economy.9 Finally, other observers openly support dollariza-
tion based not on empirical evidence and economic rhetoric;
rather, such advocacy is founded on irrefutable facts regarding
dollarization in certain industries. According to recent studies,
many large Mexican corporations have already dollarized their
operations and, during the last four years, such companies expe-
rienced an annual growth rate of sixteen percent compared to the
three percent enjoyed by the Mexican economy in its entirety.
Observers argue that such statistics demonstrate that the supe-
riority of the dollar is incontrovertible: "the dollarized Mexico is a
much better growth performer than the peso-denominated Mex-
91,199ico.
Contrary to the widespread nature of the support for dollari-
zation in Mexico, opposition to such a measure is concentrated
almost exclusively in those government officials in jeopardy of
losing power with the introduction of the dollar. For instance,
dollarization efforts have been criticized by the finance minis-
ter,2" the subdirector of the Central Bank of Mexico,20' the direc-
tor of the Central Bank of Mexico," 2 the director of the Bank of
197. Del Rio Toff6, supra note 189. "(s]o far, the Mexican experience with a floating ex-
change rate has been positive... However, these mechanisms cannot be applied indefi-
nitely." See id.
198. Id. at 14-15.
199. Salinas-Le6n, supra note 80, at 10.
200. Bate, supra note 72. The former finance Minister of Mexico, Jos6 Angel Gurria,
adamantly opposed dollarization and posed the following question: 'Would a dollar bill
with the face of Columbus be the solution? The answer is no." Id.
201. Califica de prematura la dolarizacidn, REFORMA, June 29, 2000. Everador
Elizondo, the sub-director of the Central Bank of Mexico, called dollarization a "prema-
ture proposal" because he claims that stability can be obtained via a restricted monetary
policy. See id.
202. Cesar Romero, Califica Ortiz innecesario dolarizaci6n, EL NORTE, June 25, 1999.
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Mexico,"' the Treasury Secretary of Mexico,0 4 and leaders of
conservative political parties.00 From this uniformity of voice,
one may speculate that opposition to dollarization by these offi-
cials under the guise of safeguarding national well-being and/or
patriotism, in reality, is nothing more than poorly disguised self-
interest.Such opposition to dollarization by certain government
officials, moreover, is not surprising when the historic power
structure of Mexico is briefly examined. Traditionally, Mexican
government officials have enjoyed considerable discretion and
authority over "every aspect of economic policymaking, from fis-
cal and monetary policies, to specific trade or credit regula-
tions.""0 ' Lamentably, such power has led to abuses that business
leaders, opposition political parties and non-governmental or-
ganizations have attempted to halt over many years by demand-
ing institutional reform.When viewed from the perspective of in-
stitutional reform, the demand for dollarization represents
simply "another expression of the private sector's persistent
twenty-year campaign to impose constraints on the Mexican gov-
ernment's policy-making discretion." "' This campaign is a two-
step process whereby (i) the power to manipulate monetary policy
is first removed from the president and (ii) such power is thereaf-
ter removed from the entire Mexican government vis-a-vis dol-
larizing. Those government officials that would be negatively af-
fected by dollarization have defended themselves by either
rejecting dollarization outright or creating impediments to post-
pone the debate of such a measure. As one expert explains it,
"[tihis threat to their discretionary power... may explain why
officials in the Mexican government were not (and have not been)
enthusiastic about dollarization since the opening of the de-
bate."0 8 Concurring with this explanation, other experts argue
that the implementation of dollarization is a "political" maneu-
ver, which requires, among other things, overcoming intransigent
government officials. Since this type of monetary reform involves
203. El pais se mantiene ajeno a la dolarizacidn de su economia: Banxico, EL
ECONOMISTA, Jan. 11, 2000.
204. Lilian Cruz, La dolarizacidn es un sue fo falso y una decisi6n inconveniente, EL
ECONOMISTA, June 3, 1999. Silva Herzog, the former Treasury Secretary of Mexico, said
that dollarization is bad for the country because eliminating the flexible exchange rate
would be tantamount to "amputating an arm" for Mexico. See id.





relinquishing the currency exchange rate as a tool of discretion-
ary economic management, "there are vested interests that have
to be neutralized in order to turn a viable economic policy option
[e.g. dollarization] into a political reality.""9 Likewise, other
commentators agree that although the decision to dollarize en-
tails many monetary considerations, the issue is inherently po-
litical and must resolved as such.21
Unlike the majority of his Mexican cohorts, President Fox
has not outright rejected the idea of dollarization, preferring in-
stead to argue that adoption by Mexico of the U.S. currency
would be more beneficial in the future."1 ' Fox stated, for in-
stance, that while he supports an independent central bank in
Mexico and the flexible exchange-rate system currently utilized
by his country, dollarization appears to be a viable option within
a few decades." ' To justify his reluctance to openly advocate
immediate dollarization, Fox emphasizes the disparity between
the North American nations and the need to do some long-term
planning on a multilateral level. As Fox puts it, "Itihe first step
should be to sit down and think, decide where we want to be in
the year 2030; where we three countries want to be ... Because
Mexico, let's face it, it is way, way, way behind the United States
and Canada.""
Notwithstanding these public declarations to postpone the
dollarization of Mexico, experts close to Fox speculate that, in re-
ality, this Mexican leader is already prepared to adopt the dollar.
209. Salinas-Le6n, supra note 80, at 3.
210. Benjamin J. Cohen, Political Dimensions of Dollarization (March 6-7, 2000) (paper
presented at Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas conference entitled "Dollarization: A Com-
mon Currency for the Americas"). In economic terms, dollarization is a "positive-sum
game" in which everybody wins due to (i) lower transactions cost, (ii) lower interest rates,
(iii) more liquid financial markets, (iv) increased macroeconomic stability, and (v) higher
growth rates and living standards in dollarized country. See id. By contrast, in political
terms, dollarization is deemed a "zero-sum game" wherein not everybody wins. See id.
According to the author, "Itihe political dimensions of dollarization cannot be ignored. At
a minimum, they may explain why most countries still hesitate to dollarize, despite all
the economic arguments in favor." See id.
211. See Desea Fox apertura con Amtrica Latina, EL IMPARCIAL, Aug. 9, 2000; See also
Enrique Quintana, Cdmo ve at d6lar, EL IMPARcIAL, July 19, 2000; Yolanda Morales, Cri-
sis en Norteamrica, si se fuerza la uni6n monetaria, EL ECONOMISTA, Nov. 12, 1999;
Claudia Zapata, El Euro para Europa y el d6lar .... ?EL NORTE, Feb. 22, 1999.
212. Anthony DePalma, Mexico Victor Faces Choices on Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
2000, at C1. See also John S. McClenahen, Not Business as Usual, INDUSTRY WK., Sept.
18, 2000, at 11.
213. Heather Scoffield, Fox Eyes Close Ties with Two Neighbors in North America,
WASH. TIMES, Aug.17, 2000, at A15.
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However, irrespective of his personal beliefs, without further in-
centives for Mexico to dollarize it is "too risky politically" for Fox
to advocate dollarization at this juncture because upon doing so
Fox would be labeled as anti-patriotic and "an imperialist tool to
the US."" 4 In other words, without a further inducement such as
the Monetary Act that would allow Fox to safeguard his political
career while simultaneously advocating dollarization, it is im-
probable that this recently-elected Mexican leader will support
such an audacious move.
To date, to justify his decision to postpone the dollarization
decision, the Fox administration has relied heavily on three main
arguments, none of which seem insurmountable. First, it is ar-
gued that Mexico lacks the "preconditions" necessary to dollarize.
As some experts postulate, prior to dollarizing it is imperative
that a country make several changes, including (i) effective bank
supervision and regulation, (ii) legal reform, (iii) fiscal reform to
lower government reliance on revenue from natural resources,
and (iv) changes in bankruptcy law and other legal procedures. 215
Other experts, by contrast, maintain that it is unnecessary to
wait for reforms in these areas because "the very act of dollariz-
ing will produce the changes needed to smooth out the operation
of the new regime.""' If the latter perspective is accurate, the ar-
gument by the Fox administration seems completely unsustain-
able. On the other hand, assuming arguendo that the former
214. See David R. Francis, Latin America Tightens Its Ties to the Greenback, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 18, 2000.
215. See Del Rio Toffi, supra note 188. See also Liliana Rojas-Suarez, What Exchange
Rate Arrangement Works Best for Latin America?, Presentation Before Am. Enterprise
Inst. for Public Policy Research Conference "Dollarization and Debt Markets" (Feb. 7,
2001). Rojas-Suarez disagrees with the notion espoused by dollarization supporters that
"dollarization can be implemented very quickly regardless of the state of economic and
financial conditions." Id. Prior to dollarizing, she argues, Mexico needs at a minimum to
have a sound domestic banking system (while acknowledging that the idea of dollariza-
tion is "a good one," argues that the time for such an economic transformation "has not
come yet" because doing so under the current conditions in Latin America "runs the risk
of exacerbating a financial crisis if necessary pre-conditions are not in place." Id.
216. Barry Eichengreen, When to Dollarize, Presentation at Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas Conference "Dollarization: A Common Currency for the Americas," (March 6-7,
2000) There are two major views regarding the "timing" of dollarization. See id. On one
hand, it is argued that to work effectively, dollarization must wait for complementary re-
forms in the banking system, fiscal position, labor market, and economy. See id. On the
other hand, some suggest that "dollarization need not wait on these other reforms because
the very act of dollarizing will produce the changes need to smooth the operation of the
new regime." See id. Irrespective of which view is correct, this author claims that the
issue of timing "is at the heart of the dollarization debate." Id.
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premise is the correct one, the position of the Fox administration
is still substantially undermined due to the fact that, while other
Latin American nations may admittedly not be prepared to dol-
larize, Mexico has recently fulfilled the lion's share of these pre-
conditions. For instance, a massive legal reform was commenced
in the early 1990s by former president Ernesto Zedillo," 7 Mexico
recently enacted new laws in the field of bankruptcy and secured
transactions, 21s fiscal reform and bank supervision has come as a
result of the recent bailout after the 1994 peso crisis,219 and Mex-
ico is enjoying relative political and economic stability after the
recent presidential elections.
As a second argument invoked principally by those Mexican
government officials in jeopardy of losing their personal power is
that dollarizing is tantamount to relinquishing a degree of Mexi-
can autonomy to the United States. Playing on the emotions and
intense patriotism of many of their compatriots, these leaders
endeavor to persuade the public that dollarizing would entail a
loss of sovereignty.22 According to experts, while the integration
of North American economies makes Mexico an "excellent candi-
date for dollarization," the primary impediment is the "national
pride" associated with producing the peso. As discussed previ-
ously, although understandable, this type of emotional argument
lacks a logical basis and may be overcome by a powerful message
from Mexico's new leader. In other words, "[i]f Fox could per-
217. See Nagle, supra note 79; see also Christina Biebsheimer, At the Front Line of Ju-
dicial Reform, IDB AMERICA, Jan.-Feb. 1999.
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Instituciones de Crddito, Diario Oficial, Mexico, May 23, 2000 (the new secured transac-
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Laws, 7 INTER-AM. TRADE REP. 1816-1817 (July 3, 2000); Diario Oficial, Ley de Concursos
Mercantiles, Mexico, May 2000; Jaime Rene Guerra, Mexican Insolvency Law: Que
Pasard? 17 U.S.-MEX. L. J. 151, 1999; Jos6 Maria Abascal, Mexico: New Commercial In-
solvency Law, 7 INTER-AM. TRADE REP. (July 31, 2000).
219. Juan Rams6n Hugo, Country Study-Mexico, 2 IMF RESEARCH BULLETiN (Int'l.
Monetary Fund), Mar. 2001.
220. Francisco Helguera Ramirez, Si nos dolarizamos, cesion absoluta de soberania,
Revista Siempre!, Feb. 21, 2001. See also Jos6 Angel Gurria, Mexico: Recent Develop-
ments, Structural Reforms and Future Challenges, Fin. & Dev., International Monetary
Fund, Vol.37(1), March 2000 (stating reforms include trade and capital account liberaliza-
tion, increased private sector participation in key sectors, tax reforms, liberalization of the
capital market and pension systems reforms. These changes, suggests Gurria, are the
"key component of the structural reform process" because a healthy banking system is
necessary to raise the level of domestic savings and channel then to all sectors of the
economy).
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suade Mexico to put aside its national pride.., he would be
making a great contribution to the future growth of the country's
economy."22' Regardless of the effectiveness of Fox's powers of
persuasion, the evidence demonstrates that the majority of the
Mexican public may have already concluded that relinquishing
the peso (and all of the patriotic aspects associated therewith) is
worth the economic stability achieved by dollarizing.222
The third argument espoused by the Fox administration to
postpone dollarization is the seigniorage-sharing issue. Unlike
the other two arguments put forth by the Fox administration,
this concept has merit at the present time. However, if the
Monetary Act were enacted to allow sharing approximately
eighty five percent of the seigniorage revenue with Mexico, such
argument would be completely undermined.223
Accordingly, in the absence of additional excuses by its gov-
ernment, Mexico would have no legitimate justification to impede
dollarization. One can conjecture, in addition, that this process
would be facilitated by Fox, a cautious supporter of dollarization
whose past record of success has convinced many of his true po-
tential. Pondering the question of whether the talk of dollariza-
tion of Mexico should be taken seriously, one expert answers af-
firmatively and explains that "Fox's vision [of further integrating
North America and dollarizing Mexico within the next few dec-
ades] may sound improbable. But then, so was his election to the
presidency."224 Other experts agree that Fox should not be un-
derestimated regarding his ability to persuade Mexico to dollar-
ize. Considering Fox's ability to mitigate Mexican national pride
in order to institute dollarization, it is claimed that "[oldds are
against it, of course. But after all, a little while ago, a non-PRI
president was unthinkable, too."22
V. CONCLUSION
As this article demonstrates, the advantages of dollarizing
221. Robert J. Barro, Mexico: Democracy is Great, But What About Economic Reform?
BuS. WK., July 31, 2000, at 30.
222. Luis Pazos, Los Mexicanos quieren el dolor o un peso fuerte? EL FINANC1ERO, Oct.
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223. Monetary Act § 4(a) (1999).
224. Geri Smith, Fox's Dream: A North American Common Market, BUS. WK., Aug. 14,
2000, at 56.
225. See Barro, supra note 222.
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nations at a time when they enjoy economic and political stability
are plentiful, both for the United States and the dollarizing na-
tion. Furthermore, upon closer scrutiny, it is apparent that the
arguments used by dollarization opponents to identify the alleged
downsides of this process are generally superficial, untenable and
easily refutable. The principal problem to date is that neither
the politicians nor the public have been supplied accurate infor-
mation with regard to the repercussions of dollarizing nations
such as Mexico.
In addition, the need for a law like the Monetary Act was
minimal when this legislation was first introduced because, until
recently, the only nations to adopt this economic measure were
small in terms of size and significance. This generalized igno-
rance of the true benefits of dollarization under the right condi-
tions is exemplified in arguments espoused at major seminars on
this topic. For instance, according to one observer,
In frieality, there seem to be no significant los-
ers in the U.S.; that is, no constituencies whose
material interests would be directly threatened by
dollarization. But there seem to be no significant
winners either.. .This explains why, until now,
the debate on dollarization has hardly gotten out-
side the Beltway... In turn, this also explains why
there has ben little groundswell of support for the
[Monetary Act]... Thus if the [Monetary Act] or
anything like it is to get passed, public support will
have to be generated, cultivated and actively man-
aged. Advocates of dollarization have their work
cut out for them.227
As this article demonstrates, times have certainly changed in
that recently nations throughout Latin America have engaged in
the dollarization debate, and some have opted to adopt the dollar
amid precarious conditions. Such untimely dollarization will
likely generate negative ramifications for the United States and
should, therefore, be avoided at all costs. By establishing a plan
whereby dollarizing nations are able to share the seigniorage
revenues with the United States, the Monetary Act serves to fo-
ment dollarization during relatively stable periods. While admit-
tedly not resolving all potential problems regarding dollarization,
227. See Cohen, supra note 211.
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this legislation at least addresses the economic issue (i.e., how to
equitably divide the seigniorage), which has constituted one of
the most significant obstacles to healthy dollarization in the re-
gion. For this reason, experts recognize that while the Monetary
Act is not a panacea, it is, at a minimum, "a big step forward."228
The dollarization debate in Mexico is currently quite vigor-
ous and, as expected, opinions seem diametrically opposed. For
his part, although he has exhibited a certain degree of reluctance
to introduce the concept immediately in order to safeguard his
political longevity, the newly-elected president Vicente Fox is an
open supporter of both dollarization and increased integration
between the NAFTA nations. Similarly, the dollarization move-
ment in Mexico enjoys widespread support from a variety of
groups such as the private business sector, think tanks, economic
experts, academics, multiple chambers of commerce and the pub-
lic-at-large. The opposition to this movement, by contrast, is con-
centrated almost entirely in the local politicians to whose benefit
it is to maintain the status quo. The intransigent position of this
political group, however, will likely be debilitated as the dollari-
zation debate continues. Based on this dynamic, this article
speculates that the enactment of the Monetary Act may serve as
the impetus necessary to persuade Fox and other Mexican offi-
cials to seriously evaluate the feasibility of dollarizing this nation
in the near future. Such an act, in turn, would generate the mul-
tiplicity of benefits examined in this article for both Mexico and
the United States. Accordingly, notwithstanding its untimeli-
ness when first introduced in 1999, the Monetary Act is now,
without a doubt, extremely "ripe" and meritorious of swift en-
actment.
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